Informal International Regimes : A Case Study of the Arctic Council by Smieszek, Malgorzata
ACTA ELECTRONICA UNIVERSITATIS LAPPONIENSIS 270
Malgorzata Smieszek
Informal  
International Regimes.  
A Case Study of the Arctic Council
Acta electronica Universitatis Lapponiensis 270
MALGORZATA SMIESZEK
Informal International Regimes.  
A Case Study of the Arctic Council
Academic dissertation  
to be publicly defended with the permission 
of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of 
Lapland  in lecture hall 2 on 11 December 2019 at 12 noon
Rovaniemi 2019
University of Lapland 
Faculty of Social Sciences
 
Supervised by 
Professor Oran R. Young 
Professor Petri Koikkalainen
Professor Paula Kankaanpää
Reviewed by 
Professor Leslie A. King
Professor Alf Håkon Hoel 
Opponent 
Professor Leslie A. King 
Layout: Taittotalo PrintOne
Cover: Graphic designer Reetta Linna, University of Lapland
Acta electronica Universitatis Lapponiensis
ISBN 978-952-337-186-6
ISSN 1796-6310
Permanent address to the publication: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-337-186-6
To my parents.

5
Smieszek: Informal International Regimes
Abstract
Malgorzata Smieszek
Informal International Regimes. A Case Study of the Arctic Council
Rovaniemi: University of Lapland 2019, 216 pages
Acta electronica Universitatis Lapponiensis 270
ISBN 978-952-337-186-6
ISSN 1796-6310
Institutions—understood as sets of rights, rules, principles, and decision-making 
procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these 
processes, and guide interactions among the participants—are prominent features of 
governance systems at all levels of social organizations. Regimes constitute a subset 
of institutions specialized to address functionally defined topics and/or spatially 
defined areas and this dissertation studies the Arctic Council (AC) as a case of a 
regime relevant to the Arctic. 
The AC is a high-level forum established in 1996 by eight Arctic states to promote 
and facilitate circumpolar collaboration on issues of environmental protection and 
sustainable development in the Arctic. Since the AC’s inception, the Arctic has gone 
through a profound transformation resulting from the combined forces of climate 
change and globalization, tightening the links between the region and the outside 
world, and drawing interests of various actors worldwide. In similar fashion, the AC 
has undergone a transition from a low-profile regional institution known to only 
but a few, to an acclaimed primary forum for circumpolar and global cooperation on 
issues pertaining to the Arctic. 
Despite regularly raised criticisms of its soft-law foundation and the lack of 
regulatory powers, throughout its twenty years in operation, the AC has provided 
numerous valuable contributions to Arctic governance. In order to shed light on the 
experience of the council, I examined its effectiveness, performance, and institutional 
change and dynamics through the lens of regime theory. Findings from this part of 
my study are described in detail in four peer-reviewed articles that constitute the 
second part of this thesis.
What the in-depth examination of the AC revealed are a number of features 
that set it apart from the previously examined universe of cases of international 
regimes established through the means of international treaties and legally-binding 
instruments. Hence, on the basis of the case study of the AC I formulate a concept 
of informal international regimes to designate a subset of international regimes that 
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are concluded by states through the means of non-legally binding instruments. In 
naming these regimes ‘informal’, rather than ‘soft-law’, I deliberately seek to steer away 
from discussions in which legally-binding norms are by default considered superior 
to non-legally binding ones; discussions, which focus primarily on questions of 
compliance and enforcement of international norms, view regimes chiefly in terms 
of their regulatory functions, and are mostly preoccupied with enhancing soft-law 
mechanisms via legally binding means. In moving away from the term soft law, I 
emphasize the need to consider informal international regimes in their own right, 
rather than, as they are frequently viewed, an “underdeveloped” form of collaboration 
that might evolve into hard law and legally-binding commitments in the future. 
Drawing from the observations of the AC I propose a series of initial hypotheses 
about informal international regimes to be tested through subsequent research and 
studies. I argue that informal international regimes have a number of features that 
may make them increasingly important in meeting needs for governance under 
conditions of rapid, non-linear and compound changes arising today and in the 
foreseeable future. 
Keywords: Arctic Council, Arctic, governance, effectiveness, international 
environmental regimes, informal international regimes
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Instituutiot voidaan nähdä oikeuksia, sääntöjä, periaatteita ja päätöksentekoa 
koskevien menettelytapojen koosteena, jotka määrittävät osapuolten rooleja 
ja ohjaavat heidän välistä vuorovaikutustaan. Instituutiot ovat tärkeitä 
hallintojärjestelmien muotoja kaikilla yhteiskuntien järjestäytymisen tasoilla. 
Tietyt institutionalisoituneet hallintomuodot ovat erikoistuneet vastaamaan 
toiminnallisesti tai maantieteellisesti määriteltyihin aloihin. Tämä väitös tutkii 
Arktista neuvostoa arktisuuden suhteen relevanttina hallinnon muotona.
Arktinen neuvosto on korkean tason foorumi, jonka kahdeksan arktista maata 
perustivat 1996 edistämään ja käsittelemään sirkumpolaarista yhteistyötä arktisen 
alueen ympäristönsuojelun ja kestävän kehityksen aloilla. Neuvoston perustamisen 
jälkeen arktisella alueella on tapahtunut perustavan laatuinen murros, jonka 
vaikuttavina voimina ovat olleet ilmastonmuutos ja globalisaatio yhdessä. Ne ovat 
tiivistäneet arktisen alueen ja muun maailman yhteyksiä ja herättäneet erilaisten 
toimijoiden intressejä maailmanlaajuisesti. Vastaavaan tapaan Arktinen neuvosto 
on käynyt läpi muutoksen matalan profiilin alueellisesta ja harvojen tuntemasta 
instituutiosta tunnustetuksi ja ensisijaiseksi foorumiksi arktista aluetta koskevissa 
sirkumpolaarisissa ja globaaleissa kysymyksissä.
Kaksikymmenvuotisen olemassaolonsa aikana Arktinen neuvosto on tuottanut 
paljon arktisen hallinnon kannalta arvokkaita panoksia huolimatta siitä, että 
sen toiminta on luonteeltaan ei-sitovaa (soft law) ja että neuvostoa on toistuvasti 
kritisoitu osapuolia sitovan toimivallan puutteesta. Voidakseni valaista neuvoston 
työtä koskevia kokemuksia olen tutkinut hallintoteorian valossa Arktisen 
neuvoston tehokkuutta, suorituskykyä, institutionaalisia muutoksia ja dynamiikkaa. 
Tutkimukseni tämän osan tulokset on selostettu yksityiskohtaisesti neljässä 
vertaisarvioidussa artikkelissa, jotka muodostavat väitöskirjani toisen osan.
Useat aiemmin tutkituista kansainvälisen hallinnon muodoista on perustettu 
kansainvälisten sopimusten ja laillisesti sitovien instrumenttien kautta. Arktisen 
neuvoston syvällinen tarkastelu paljastaa piirteitä, jotka erottavat sen edellä 
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mainituista. Näin ollen olen Arktista neuvostoa koskevan työni pohjalta olen 
muodostanut epävirallisen kansainvälisen hallinnon (informal international 
regimes) käsitteen määrittämään sitä kansainvälisten hallintojärjestelmien 
alaryhmää, johon valtiot ovat päätyneet ei-velvoittavien instrumenttien kautta. 
Nimeämällä nämä hallintorakenteet epävirallisiksi sen sijaan että käyttäisin 
pehmeän lain käsitettä haluan hakeutua poispäin keskusteluista, joissa laillisesti 
sitovia normeja lähtökohtaisesti pidetään parempina kuin ei-sitovia. Nämä viralliset 
regiimit keskittyvät ennen muuta kansainvälisten normien noudattamiseen ja 
toimeenpanoon, joissa hallinto nähdään ensisijaisesti säätelevien toimintojen kautta 
ja joissa enimmältään keskitytään pehmeän lain mekanismien vahvistamiseen 
laillisesti sitovien keinojen kautta. Liikkumalla poispäin pehmeän lain käsitteestä 
korostan tarvetta käsitellä epävirallisia kansainvälisiä hallinnon muotoja omana 
itsenään sen sijaan että ne nähtäisiin, kuten useasti tapahtuu, ”alikehittyneinä” 
yhteistoiminnan muotoina, jotka saattavat tulevaisuudessa kehittyä velvoittavaksi 
laiksi ja laillisesti sitoviksi sitoumuksiksi.
Arktista neuvostoa koskevien havaintojen pohjalta ehdotan alustavia hypoteeseja, 
jotka koskevat epävirallisia kansainvälisiä hallintomuotoja ja joita tulee testata 
myöhemmissä tutkimuksissa. Väitteeni mukaan epävirallisten kansainvälisten 
hallintomuotojen piirteistö voi antaa niille kasvavaa merkitystä hallinnon 
tarpeisiin vastaamiseksi tilanteissa, joita nyt ja tulevaisuudessa leimaavat nopeat, ei-
säännönmukaiset ja monitahoiset muutokset.
Avainsanat: Arktinen neuvosto, arktinen, hallinto, tehokkuus, kansainväliset 
ympäristöhallinnot, epäviralliset kansainväliset hallinnot
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1. INTRODUCTION
The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. 
‘Where shall I begin, please your Majesty?’ he asked. 
‘Begin at the beginning,’ the King said gravely, 
‘and go on till you come to the end: then stop.’
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Chapter 12
1.1. General Introduction
1.1.1. Institutional dimensions of global environmental change
Institutions—understood as sets of rights, rules, principles, and decision-making 
procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these 
processes, and guide interactions among the participants—are prominent features 
of governance systems at all levels of social organizations (Young, 2008, 2017b). 
Accordingly, institutions also feature prominently in human-environmental 
relations, both as causes of and solutions to major changes in bio-geophysical 
systems, as well as to the effects of those changes on human welfare (North, 1990; 
Young, 2002). Regimes constitute a subset of institutions specialized in addressing 
functionally defined topics and/or spatially defined areas (Young, 2017b). Whereas 
there is a wide consensus that regimes matter, the ways in which they matter, the 
extent to which they matter, and the conditions under which they matter vary 
widely across the universe of existing cases (Young, 2004). The main drivers in the 
study of international regimes have therefore been, first and foremost, an interest 
in understanding the ways in which these arrangements affect the course of world 
affairs, and how, as governance mechanisms, they can steer the collective behaviour 
of societies towards desirable outcomes and away from undesirable ones.
A field that has generated much interest in questions of governance is international 
environmental politics, which in the decades following World War II has seen the 
unprecedented institutionalization and growth of functionally specific regimes. 
These are mostly centred around a great number of multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) and their respective organizational arrangements (secretariats 
and conferences of the parties; Kanie, 2018; Young, 1997). International law has 
played a preeminent role in the structuring of international affairs in the post-
WWII system, and inter-state treaties have become one of the most prevalent forms 
of response to challenges of maintaining order, resolving conflicts, and assuring the 
sustainable use of natural resources (Reinicke & Witte, 2000; D. L. Shelton, 2000). 
The focus on states as central actors in world politics has been also characteristic of 
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regime theory, particularly in its early decades (Stokke, 2012). Although the concept 
of regimes has not precluded consideration of the interests and roles of various non-
state and sub-state actors, the tendency of much regime analysis has been to focus 
predominantly on institutions that are governmental and intergovernmental in 
nature (Breitmeier, Young, & Zürn, 2006; Young, 2008). Regime scholars initially 
centred their attention on questions of regime formation; later, upon overcoming 
the incredulity and scepticism of realist-oriented academics, they turned towards 
examining issues of regime effectiveness, institutional change and dynamics, and 
institutional interplay, among others. 
Concurrently, globalization—the emergence of new actors and of “agency 
beyond the state”— has led scholars to focus their inquiry on matters pertaining 
to global environmental governance. It is within this movement that research on 
transnational environmental regimes has arisen as part of the examination of new 
forms of international cooperation resulting from the increased participation of 
non-state actors in transnational and global affairs. Respectively, whereas in the case 
of international regimes, states are the generators of “principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in 
a given issue area” (Krasner, 1983: 2), in the case of transnational regimes it is non-
governmental actors who give rise to relevant social practices. What follows is that 
the rules and norms of transnational regimes, oftentimes coined in a form of business 
codes of conduct or certification schemes (Pattberg, 2012), are not legally binding, 
unlike the outputs of many international regimes—at least those that have been the 
main objects of scholarly attention. As a review of regime literature reveals, virtually 
all international regimes analyzed thus far have their bases in legally-binding treaties 
or conventions. While this assertion alone is unsurprising, given that multilateral 
environmental agreements are the cornerstone of global environmental governance, 
it also points to an important gap in existing scholarship: the unexamined territory 
of cases of international regimes based on non-legally binding instruments such as 
political declarations, joint communiqués, memoranda of understanding, and more. 
One such regime, the Arctic Council (AC), is the focus of this dissertation and it 
was the in-depth exploration of the AC as an innovative governance mechanism that 
ultimately led me to formulate the idea of informal international regimes and their 
potential contributions to governance in times of change. 
1.1.2. Governing a planet in flux
The scale and character of a multitude of changes observed in today’s world are 
nothing short of a fundamental transformation of the Earth’s system. Not only 
are humans and their biophysical environment more closely connected than ever 
before, but humanity has evolved to become a force of geological order, a major 
driver of changes across scales and levels, able to influence global geophysical 
systems and dominate ecosystems on a global scale (Steffen, Sanderson, Tyson, 
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Jäger, & Matson, 2004). Biodiversity—the diversity within species, between species, 
and of ecosystems—is presently declining at least tens to hundreds of times more 
rapidly than at any time in human history (IPBES, 2019). On May 13, 2019, as 
reported by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, the concentration of CO2 in 
the atmosphere reached over 415 parts per million (ppm), the highest level since 
before the evolution of homo sapiens (Scripps Institution of Oceanography, 2019). 
Climate change driven by human activities serves as perhaps the most prominent 
example of the influence of humans on the Earth’s system as well as an illustration of 
challenges that transcend the boundaries and capacities of any state and any single 
actor. Accelerating globalization continues to exacerbate cross-border environmental 
problems, making it effectively impossible to shield spatially delimited areas from 
the impact of forces operating at larger scales and to address emerging issues in 
isolation (Young, 2017b). As noted by international relations and legal scholars, 
the complexity of the new global environment has outpaced traditional methods of 
international law-making and raised doubts about their continued utility (Chinkin, 
2000; Reinicke & Witte, 2000), demanding responses and mechanisms adequate 
to meet arising governance needs, many of which go beyond typical regulatory 
functions (Young, 2017a). 
In many ways, the Arctic serves as a microcosm of the developments that have 
unfolded in the global arena since World War II. Prior to the late 1980s, the region 
was heavily militarized and divided into two armed camps, and the Arctic agenda 
was dominated by the core issues of the Cold War, with classical security issues at 
the territory’s forefront (Osherenko & Young, 1989; Young, 2012a). The collapse 
of the Soviet Union led, as elsewhere in the world, to a sharp reorientation of Arctic 
regional affairs and fostered a variety of initiatives aimed at circumpolar, rather than 
global, collaboration (Keskitalo, 2004; Young, 2009a). By the beginning of the 
21st century, the pronounced impacts of climate change observable in the rapidly 
declining Arctic sea ice—combined with the forces of globalization visible in the 
expected extraction of northern energy resources and the growth of commercial 
shipping—made the Arctic a region of intense interest on a worldwide scale. As if 
through a lens, we observe today in the Arctic a mosaic of diverse state and non-
state actors, their interests, interactions, and the tightening links between them. 
These actors include great powers, small states, indigenous peoples, environmental 
groups, and large multinational and private corporations, as well as a multitude of 
non-Arctic states, including emerging powers that seek to reassert their positions in 
a region of increasing global significance.
As both the observed and projected annual average warming in the Arctic 
continues to be more than twice the global mean (AMAP, 2017c), the region remains 
at the forefront of global climate change. At the same time, the Arctic has long 
been at the front line of experimentation with new forms of innovative responses 
to complex and challenging problems of governance (Arctic Governance Project, 
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2010), and the AC has taken a prime position in a wide network of cooperative 
arrangements and international mechanisms pertaining to the Arctic. As earlier 
studies of the AC have asserted, throughout its 20 years in operation, the council has 
made important contributions to Arctic governance. Among these are increasing 
the prominence of the concerns of Arctic indigenous peoples, producing influential 
scientific assessments, providing a venue for negotiations for the first circumpolar 
legally binding agreements, and promoting peace in the region, which previously 
served as one of the main theatres of the Cold War.
Nevertheless, as the articles included in this dissertation show, there are many 
aspects of the AC that remain understudied. Moreover, even if the AC represents an 
unambiguous case of a regime as the term is used in broader international relations 
literature, only a few studies of the AC have thus far adopted regimes’ perspective 
in seeking to deepen our understanding of the council. As the research presented in 
this thesis demonstrates, the application of this theory may not only advance our 
comprehension of the AC, but the case study of the AC may also contribute to our 
broader body of knowledge about international institutions. The potential for such 
contribution is arguably even greater due to a number of characteristics that the 
AC exhibits and that set it apart from the previously examined universe of cases of 
international regimes. Finally, given that the council is the central institution in the 
institutional landscape of the region that serves as the world’s climate “messenger” 
(Stone, 2015), I believe its case presents the potential to inform our thinking about 
innovative institutional ways of addressing the paramount challenges of the climate-
altered world. 
As such, the overall aim of work presented in this dissertation is twofold. First, 
the study aims to shed light on the experience of the Arctic Council by examining 
it in a systematic manner through the lens of regime theory. Second, it poses 
a question whether the experience of the AC can, in reverse, contribute insights that 
may be of more general relevance to our understanding of regimes and international 
institutions. The realization of both objectives is supported by the research method 
and materials described in the section 1.3. Before it, the next section first tells the 
story of my own interest in the Arctic and of the evolution of work laid out in this 
thesis. 
1.2. Research Process
The work presented in this thesis reflects the evolution of my interest in Arctic issues 
and a journey through the questions I posed at various stages of my work and which, 
despite my efforts, I was unable to answer in a full and satisfying manner. Each 
such question, however, served as an important signpost on my research pathway 
and pointed to apparent gaps in our knowledge as well as to directions for my own 
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inquiry. I therefore believe it merits space here to explain how my approach to my 
research topic evolved and how, building from one step to the next, it led to the 
results presented in the conclusions of this dissertation.
My work on Arctic issues formally began in May 2013 when I joined the EU-
funded project “Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of the Development 
of the Arctic” (Stępień, Koivurova, & Kankaanpää, 2014), where I was a co-author 
of one of the project’s main reports, “Assessments in Policy-Making: Case Studies 
from the Arctic Council” (Kankaanpää & Smieszek, 2014). Although I was invited 
to join the group because of my strong background in European Union studies, and 
my original focus in Arctic affairs concerned the role of the European Union in the 
region, the project shifted my interests towards the mechanisms and intricacies of the 
science-policy interface, and towards the AC, the forum exemplifying that interface, 
which around that time was making worldwide headlines with its ministerial 
meeting in Kiruna, Sweden and with China, India and other Asian countries “at the 
council’s doors”. 
My interest in science-policy interlinkages continued from there, and in 2014 
I joined as a fellow the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), a major non-
governmental, international scientific organization committed to the promotion, 
facilitation, and advancement of Arctic science. Involvement with IASC not only 
offered me tremendous opportunity to engage with scientists across a wide social-
natural science spectrum but also proved vital to my own research in ways I could not 
have dreamt of (let alone anticipated) when I applied to the fellowship programme. 
As a member of IASC’s delegation, I was able to attend as an officially accredited 
observer to the AC more than a dozen council meetings spanning the United States 
and Finland’s chairmanships of the AC, and across all levels of the council’s structures 
and organization. This included meetings of various working groups, expert groups, 
and task forces, and two ministerial meetings in 2017 and 2019. My attendance at 
these meetings provided me with the unique opportunity to observe the internal 
dynamics of the council in its various forms and sensitized me to great diversity 
within the AC—a factor that later proved important to my own query.
I have been exposed to work of the AC in other ways as well. Among them 
was my participation in the two so-called Warsaw Format Meetings organized by 
Poland to facilitate discussions between state observers to the AC and the council’s 
sitting chairmanship. The first meeting I attended took place in March 2015 during 
Canadian AC chairmanship and the second in April 2016, during the U.S.’s time at 
the helm of the council. Both gatherings, as well as the observable differences in how 
the two countries approached their chairing roles, drew my attention to the role of 
chairmanship in the council, a topic that at that time was relatively underresearched 
and which led to my first publication on the subject, included in this thesis. 
In the meantime, in January 2016 I began work on the research project “Finland’s 
Arctic Council chairmanship in times of increasing uncertainty” for Finland’s 
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Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). The project was conducted via a consortium 
formed by the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland (where I work); the 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), and the Marine Research Centre 
of the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE). Its aim was to provide the MFA 
and government officials responsible for Arctic affairs with relevant, updated, and 
trustworthy information regarding the political and economic situation in the Arctic 
region. Although I contributed to the project largely from my earlier experience 
with and knowledge of the council, participation in it once more provided me with 
an opportunity to observe the AC from a close distance and sometimes in ways not 
accessible to many other researchers. 
Throughout this period of time, my main question with respect to the AC 
concerned its effectiveness and, in particular, drawing from my continued science-
policy interest, how the organization of science-policy interface of the council 
impacts upon its effectiveness. The overarching research question I initially posed 
to myself was, ‘How has change, if any, in the science-policy interface of the AC 
affected the council’s effectiveness?’. As it turned out, however, the answer to this 
question was anything but straightforward, and the quest to address it brought my 
inquiry and this dissertation to the resolution, which I did not see until late in the 
process. 
First, when it comes to the relationship between science and policy in the 
AC, observing the council’s various working groups and constellations made me 
increasingly aware of the difficulty of drawing general conclusions about the council 
from a study of only one or a few of its subsidiary bodies. Whereas the council is 
organized virtually in the same manner at all of its various levels—meaning it includes 
representatives of eight Arctic states, six organizations of permanent participants, a 
chair, secretarial support and, in the majority of cases, observers to the AC—each 
unit simultaneously has its own specifications, its own expert groups and networks 
of collaborators, and its own priorities and modes of work. Moreover, only half of 
the council’s groups are science-oriented; the other half focuses mostly on small-
scale, practical projects executed in various parts of the Arctic. The realization of this 
fact made me conscious that if there has been, as I had assumed, any change in the 
council throughout its existence, the implications of this change may have differed 
widely for various AC bodies. To give an example, if increasing political stakes in 
the Arctic could mean, as has been reported by some of the council’s participants, 
a more constrained role for science compared to the AC’s earlier days, the growing 
political attention could simultaneously bring other benefits and a more conducive 
environment for the work of other working groups. In brief, it was not easy to devise 
statements that could apply across the diversity of the council. 
Neither was it straightforward to determine the effectiveness of the AC, a point 
that immediately arose when I began reflecting on the impacts of change on the 
AC’s effectiveness. While the term ‘effectiveness’ is intuitively simple, it quickly 
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became apparent that, as in broader international relations literature, various Arctic 
scholars and practitioners define it in multiple ways, frequently without specifying 
the exact meaning they assign to the concept and consequently speaking more past 
one other than with one other. To address this point, I turned to the voluminous 
literature on international environmental institutions and their effectiveness, and 
through application of insights from a general regime theory I sought to bring more 
clarity into a debate on the contested effectiveness and performance of the council. 
Regime theory and, more broadly, scholarship on global environmental governance 
have been formative to my thinking about Arctic affairs in general and the AC in 
particular. The pioneering works of Oran R. Young on cooperation and conflict in 
the Arctic, and on the AC and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, directed my research 
interests and helped me to view Arctic institutions as materializations of a wider 
phenomenon that has been studied extensively by the broader scholarly community 
outside of circumpolar/northern affairs. At the same time, apart from Young’s and 
a few other authors’ works, I did not see much systematic application of regime theory 
to the Arctic institutional landscape, which in my view presented an important gap 
worth exploring, with potential contributions both to our understanding of Arctic 
institutions and the region’s governance and to the theory itself. I address this in the 
second article included in this thesis, “Evaluating Institutional Effectiveness: The 
Case of the Arctic Council”. 
Whereas the aim of the study was to draw up a basic framework through which 
future assessments of the AC’s effectiveness could be grounded in the general 
literature on international regimes, the paper also highlighted the potential of new, 
non-legally binding instruments at the council’s disposal for increasing the AC’s 
effectiveness and filling gaps between larger global regulatory arrangements. Their 
adoption, however, was not met with enthusiasm near that which accompanied 
the signing of the first legally-binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of 
the AC—a fact that again turned my attention towards the question of changes 
occurring in the council and, more importantly, their promoted direction. 
Institutional change can arise both intentionally and unintentionally, and 
deliberate institutional reforms are only one among many mechanisms that 
transform the structures, functions, and operations of international institutions. The 
AC has been subjected to proposals for reforms practically since its establishment, 
and criticism of the council, coupled with ideas for improving its results, has been 
among the steadiest and most discernible threads in the rapidly growing literature 
dedicated to the AC. The systematization and evaluation of those proposals became 
the core of my third article, “Do the Cures Match the Problem? Reforming the Arctic 
Council”. The article revealed that certain ideas to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the AC—such as the strengthening of its legal arsenal and equipping 
the council with more regulatory instruments—have been promoted virtually since 
the body’s inception and irrespective of rapid change transforming the region’s 
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socio-environmental setting. This finding, in turn, highlighted the prevalence of 
thinking—also in the Arctic context—that considers hard law superior to soft law, 
focuses predominantly on regulatory tasks, and concentrates largely on questions 
of rule implementation and compliance, despite recognized contributions of the 
AC in other areas. Interestingly, the focus on legally-binding regimes frequently 
tasked with regulatory functions has also been characteristic of empirical studies of 
regime theory at large. While the concept of a regime is by no means constrained 
to formal arrangements based on treaties and conventions, the collection of case 
studies carried out by the scholarly community has been largely confined to them, 
with only a few exceptions. Viewed from this perspective, against a broader picture 
of theory and studies of regimes, the AC presented an interesting outlier—an 
important observation that stirred my thinking and ultimately directed the course 
of my further work.
The fact that the AC does not uniformly fit into the vocabulary adopted 
by regime literature is even more apparent in the last article included in this 
thesis, “Steady as She Goes? Structure, Change Agents and the Evolution of the 
Arctic Council”, in which I analyzed change within the council from the body’s 
establishment to the present day. In so doing, I adopted a standpoint distinct from 
most studies of the AC, which sought sources of the AC’s evolution in exogenous 
factors and external developments. In order to complement that outlook, I 
concentrated explicitly on the endogenous factors and properties of the AC and 
examined their role in enabling or constraining the council’s institutional change. 
Among other findings, I determined that many distinctions proposed in the general 
literature on regimes and institutional change do not correspond to the types of 
change that the AC experienced—a conclusion that is perhaps unsurprising given 
that these categorizations were developed with a different universe of cases in 
mind. Nonetheless, in terms of my own inquiry, this finding was important, as it 
confirmed earlier indications that the AC may indeed represent a case divergent 
from others; this would indicate a category, or subcategory, of regimes that has not 
been explicitly addressed and that, as I argue here, may be worth examination in 
its own right. I designate this category as informal international regimes. While I 
elaborate on this in the second-to-last chapter of the first part of this thesis, in brief, 
I view a category of informal international regimes as arrangements concluded by 
states by means of non-legally binding instruments such as political declarations, 
memoranda of understanding, joint communiqués, and so forth to govern spatially 
and/or functionally delineated areas. In naming these regimes ‘informal’, rather than 
‘soft-law’, I deliberately seek to steer away from discussions in which legally-binding 
norms are by default considered superior to non-legally binding ones; discussions, 
which focus primarily on questions of compliance and enforcement of international 
norms, which view regimes chiefly in terms of their regulatory functions, and which 
are mostly preoccupied with enhancing soft-law mechanisms via legally binding 
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means. I consider informal international regimes a subset of the overall universe of 
international regimes, and in describing them, I see a major theoretical contribution 
of this dissertation.
1.3.  Research Approach
1.3.1. Case study method 
The research method adopted in this thesis is a single case study of the AC used “as 
the opportunity to shed empirical light on some theoretical concepts or principles” 
(Yin, 2018: 38), specifically the concept of regimes (see George & Bennett, 2005). 
Overall, the study is based on an inductive approach: it began with a general aim 
and, as it progressed, remained open to new relations and understandings, allowing 
for analytic generalization and, eventually, for proposing a new concept towards the 
end of the research process. 
A case study approach relies on multiple sources of evidence and allows for a 
multitude of methods to be used in collecting and analyzing information. The use 
of several data sources is advantageous in that it allows for the triangulation and 
testing of ideas generated through one part of the study in relation to those unveiled 
by a different method or data source (Yin, 2018). This study generally used three 
major lines of investigation, even if not all of them were used in each of the articles 
included in this thesis. All of the applied methods were qualitative. They included 
document analysis, interviews, and observations. In addition, a literature review 
of regime theory and of scholarship on various aspects related to international 
environmental institutions served as a backbone to this work, complemented in the 
case of individual articles by studies of formal leadership in international cooperation 
(Article 1) and gradual institutional change (Article 4). 
Concurrently, it is important to mention one of the major common concerns 
raised with regard to case study as a research strategy, which is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization. The frequently posed question in this context 
concerns the extent to which cases selected for inquiry are representative of some 
larger universe or population. A brief answer offered by the proponents of this method 
of examination is that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions, and 
not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study does not represent a 
“sample”, and the goal of an investigator is to expand theories, aiming at analytic 
generalization (Yin, 2018). It is in this current that this study situates itself. 
1.3.1.1. Document analysis
The primary sources used for document analysis comprised official documentation 
of the AC: AC ministerial declarations (1996–2017), AC rules of procedure and 
the council’s various operating guidelines, reports of Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) 
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to ministers (1996–2017), selected scientific reports and reports of the AC working 
groups to SAOs, as well as minutes from selected meetings of the working groups. 
The inclusion of documents from various levels of the council’s organization and 
covering the entire council’s existence allowed me to follow not only the evolution 
of the AC from the moment of its inception, but also, to some extent, to trace how 
views on the AC and on Arctic developments evolved among AC participants 
over time. All primary source materials used in this dissertation are included in the 
reference lists of the four articles. 
1.3.1.2. Observation
As previously mentioned, in the course of my work I attended more than a dozen 
meetings of the AC at the various levels of AC organization. Participation in these 
meetings allowed me to observe how the AC operates in practice and gave me first-
hand knowledge of council’s processes, and the field observations I made there were 
an important source of my understanding of the council. The meetings included: five 
meetings of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), four plenary 
meetings of SAOs, one meeting of the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME) working group, one meeting of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Program (AMAP) working group, one meeting of the Task Force on Arctic Marine 
Cooperation (TFAMC), one meeting of the Ecosystem-Based Management Expert 
Group (EA-EG) of the PAME working group, and two AC ministerial meetings. 
The AC events I attended specifically included:
 – Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG): 
0 11–12 March 2016, Barrow, Alaska, United States
0 1–2 October 2016, Orono, Maine, United States
0 21–22 September 2017, Inari, Finland
0 19–20 March 2018, Levi, Finland
0 5–6 February 2019, Kemi, Finland
 – Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) plenary meetings:
0 15–17 March 2016, Fairbanks, Alaska, United States
0 4–6 October 2016, Portland, Maine, United States
0 24–26 October 2017, Oulu, Finland
0 22–23 March 2018, Levi, Finland
 – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) working group:
0 November/December 2016, Helsinki, Finland
 – Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group:
0 19–21 September 2016, Portland, Maine, United States
 – Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group (EA-EG) of PAME working 
group:
0 18 September 2016, Portland, Maine, United States
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 – Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC):
0 22–23 September 2016, Portland, Maine, United States
 – AC Ministerial meetings:
0 10–11 May 2017, Fairbanks, Alaska, United States
0 6–7 May 2019, Rovaniemi, Finland
It is important to note that I attended all of these meetings as an officially accredited 
observer to the AC as part of the IASC. Accordingly, my role in these meetings 
was strictly defined and regulated by the AC rules of procedure (Arctic Council, 
2013a) as they pertain to observers to the council. In the few instances in which I 
took the floor during the meetings, it was solely in relation to my involvement with 
IASC, and the points I made were related exclusively to IASC-relevant initiatives, 
activities, or projects, with no connection to my own research focus. 
It is nonetheless justifiable to question the extent to which my participation in 
the meetings and the resultant interference with the object of my inquiry could find 
reflection in and possibly bias the results of my research, given my dual role as both 
an active participant in the process and an independent investigator interested in 
the functioning of the AC. In addressing this point, it is worth emphasizing two 
conditions that, I am strongly convinced, preserve the integrity of my work. The first 
condition relates to the already mentioned AC rules of procedure and, specifically, 
the role that these rules assign to observers to the council. As stipulated by Article 
38 of the council’s revised rules of procedure from 2013: “The primary role of 
Observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council’ (Arctic Council, 2013a; 
emphasis added by this author). Secondly, to keep to a minimum any reflection or 
potential impact of my participation in the AC meetings on the results of my study, 
I deliberately excluded from its scope—to the extent possible—the examination of 
the role of observers to the council and whenever needed, I referred to works of 
other authors on this topic. 
Regardless of the level of formality of the meetings, there is a social component 
to them that provided me with opportunities for informal discussions with various 
participants of the AC community. These discussions were very helpful in improving 
my comprehension of the council. It was also during these conversations that 
I informed my interlocutors about my research project on the AC. Notwithstanding, 
seeing that my official role in the AC meetings was as an accredited AC observer, 
I did not use any of the observations made there as a direct material or source of 
information in my research articles.
In addition to official meetings of the AC, I also attended official conferences of 
AMAP working group in Helsinki, Finland (29 November 2016) and in Reston, 
VA, United States (24–27 April 2017), as well as the second Arctic Biodiversity 
Congress of the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group 
in Rovaniemi, Finland (9 –11 November 2018). Furthermore, during the course of 
28
Smieszek: Informal International Regimes
my work on this dissertation, in conjunction with my work as a researcher at the 
Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland, I participated in a plethora of other 
Arctic conferences and events, among them the Arctic Environmental Ministers’ 
meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland (11–12 October 2018); the Arctic Circle Assembly 
in Reykjavik, Iceland (annually from 2013–2018); the Arctic Frontiers conference 
in Tromsø, Norway (2013, 2016, 2018, 2019); and the Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit 
conference in Rovaniemi, Finland (2015, 2017), as well as numerous other seminars 
and venues. Besides the opportunity to observe presentations and discussions of 
various Arctic actors and stakeholders, the above listed events also provided me 
in some instances with venues for conducting interviews with the AC and other 
individuals.
1.3.1.3. Interviews
Interviews served as sources of data for two out of four articles included in this 
dissertation: “The Role of Arctic Council Chairmanship” and “Steady as She Goes? 
Structure, Change Agents, and the Evolution of the Arctic Council”. The purpose of 
the interviews was to gather information that was not included in or elaborated upon 
in written documents and to collect information on the participants’ own views on 
events and developments related to the council. Between March 2015 and February/
March 2019, I conducted a total of 17 interviews with persons directly involved 
in various capacities with the AC over various periods of the council’s operation. 
Among the interviewees were chairs of SAOs, SAOs, executive secretaries and 
members of the working groups, permanent participants and observers, and officials 
from the Arctic states’ ministries of foreign affairs. All of the interviews were semi-
structured and lasted between 30–80 minutes. Most were conducted via telephone 
or Skype upon earlier arrangement with interviewees, and five of the interviews were 
conducted in person in Reykjavik, Iceland; Rovaniemi, Finland; Oslo, Norway; and 
Warsaw, Poland. All of the interviews were recorded in my handwriting, and in all 
cases the interviewees wished to remain anonymous.
Fig. 1 Breakdown of interviewees
Type of organization Number of participants
Chairs of Senior Arctic Officials 5
Senior Arctic Officials 3
Arctic Council Working Groups 4
Permanent Participants 2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ officials 2
Observers 1
29
Smieszek: Informal International Regimes
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of two parts: a synthesis and four peer-reviewed research articles. 
The synthesis provides an overall background to my doctoral inquiry. It includes 
relevant theoretical frameworks, presents the Arctic as a complex system, and 
offers an introduction to a case of the AC—both with respect to the history of the 
institution as well as the voluminous scholarship dedicated to it. Moreover, the 
synthesis provides an overview of the main findings from the four research articles 
that constitute the second part of this thesis. Finally, and most importantly, building 
from these findings, towards the end of this first part, I put forward the concept of 
informal international regimes.
1.4.1. Synthesis 
The synthesis has the following structure: 
Chapter 1, “Introduction”, offers an overview of the work presented in this 
dissertation as well as of my own academic quest to better understand the AC. 
It describes the materials and research methods I used and outlines the relevance as 
well as limitations of this study. 
Chapter 2 provides a concise review of regime theory from its beginnings in the 
1970s and 1980s to the present day. In doing so, it sets the theoretical stage for this 
thesis. It covers, among other topics, initial disputes around the concept of regimes; 
the large variety of existing regimes; and studies of regime formation, effectiveness, 
and institutional interplay. It concludes with a presentation of transnational 
environmental regimes and the evolution of scholarly interest in themes of global 
environmental governance and governance architecture.
Chapter 3 is an introduction to the Arctic region. Brief by necessity, it sketches 
out primarily those features of the Arctic that, together with the unparalleled scale 
and pace of change transforming the region, make it a complex system necessitating 
fitting and flexible forms of response. Understanding of the main features of the 
Arctic socio-ecological environment as well as the dynamics and processes of the 
region’s unrelenting change is vital to contextualization of the work presented in 
this thesis, which ultimately poses a question about the adequacy of past modes of 
thinking and encourages more careful examination of a wider range of governance 
arrangements at our disposal, including those based on non-legally binding 
instruments.
Chapter 4 takes a bird’s-eye view of Arctic governance and a closer look at the main 
circumpolar cooperation forum and the focus of this thesis—the AC. Repetitive 
by default, with some information also included in the articles in the second part 
of this dissertation, the chapter is nonetheless central to this work, as in addition 
to highlighting some of the AC’s major contributions and accomplishments, it 
points to its underexplored potential in informing our thinking about governance 
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mechanisms suitable to times of transformation, increasing connectivity, and 
prevailing uncertainty. 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of four research articles included in the second 
part of this dissertation: their topics, methods, and key findings. 
Chapter 6 turns towards international law and specifically to discussions 
pertaining to the concept of soft law. It should be emphasised that by no means is 
the presented overview of these discussions exhaustive, nor does it provide detailed 
coverage of the long and convoluted debates over the term within the legal scholarly 
community. Instead, Chapter 6 outlines some of the main points from those 
discussions, as well as the general pros and cons of international non-legally binding 
norms, instruments, and arrangements. In doing so, it sets the stage for Chapter 7 
and the presentation of the concept of informal international regimes. 
In Chapter 7, drawing from the analysis of the AC, I formulate a series of 
observations about informal international regimes, mostly by noting their key 
differences from formal, legally-binding arrangements. As these observations are 
inferred from a single case of the AC, I put them forward more as hypotheses for 
future research and examination rather than statements with any far-reaching 
generalizability at this stage of this work. At the same time, at the end of this chapter 
I list arguments, which I believe grant much relevance to the pursuit of and increased 
interest in the study of informal international regimes. 
The dissertation closes with conclusions summing up findings from the presented 
work, including the main theoretical contribution drawn from this in-depth 
examination of the AC: the concept of informal international regimes.
1.4.2. Articles
The second part of this dissertation contains four distinct articles, each with 
one particular topic related to the case of the AC. Two of the articles have been 
published and two have been vetted for publication in peer-reviewed international 
journals prior to inclusion in this thesis. The articles are included here in their final, 
accepted manuscript versions and reproduced with permission of the publishers. 
Since all of the articles were published in different journals, each follows the 
respective publisher’s guidelines concerning the required citation style. With this 
single exception for citation style, all of the articles are, for the reader’s convenience, 
incorporated here in the same format as the rest of the thesis.
Although I am a co-author of Article 1, I am the sole author of Articles 2,3, 
and 4. Since each article stands as a separate research publication, a certain degree 
of overlap between them has been unavoidable, especially concerning basic 
information on the AC’s mandate and structure and an overview of its history. 
Nevertheless, each article deals with separate research questions and provides new 
insights into our understanding of the AC. The combined findings from these 
four articles served, in turn, as a basis for my further work and a formulation of 
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the previously mentioned concept of informal international regimes presented in 
Part 1 of this thesis. 
1.5. Relevance and Limitations of the Study
The relevance of the research presented in this thesis can be considered on two levels: 
first, with respect to specific research findings related to the AC and second, with 
regard to a more overarching theoretical contribution proposed on the basis of those 
individual insights. Concerning the former, the conclusions of each of the articles 
advance our understanding of the council as far as the role of AC chairmanships 
and the AC’s effectiveness, reforms, and institutional changes are concerned. 
Considering the steadily rising interest in the council and its work, each of these 
areas is of significant importance to the functioning of the AC; thus, my hope is that 
the presented results may at least partially inform discussions about the AC’s future 
trajectory and development. 
Regarding theoretical contribution, the study of the AC allowed for the 
formulation of the concept of informal international regimes as a previously 
unexamined subset of the universe of cases concerning international regimes. In 
this sense, the work presented here illustrates one of the characteristics of medium-
range theories, including regime theory—through working back and forth between 
evidence from real world politics and the more abstract levels of international 
relations deliberations, this thesis seeks to explore ideas that have the potential to 
produce insights that would not only be of considerable importance in theoretical 
terms but simultaneously have far-reaching practical and policy-relevant implications, 
helping decision-makers to effectively navigate the increasingly complex landscape 
of international environmental politics and governance (Young, 2017b). As the list 
of arguments included in Chapter 6 shows, I believe there are compelling grounds 
that grant relevance to a more systematic inquiry of informal, non-legally binding 
arrangements among more than 200 states with various legal traditions, capacities, 
and expressions of statehood. 
At the same time, it is equally important to note limitations of this study that 
stem both from its research method and its overall approach. As mentioned earlier, 
with respect to the former, the case study method, in particular with a single unit 
of inquiry, has obvious constraints when it comes to offering any general claims 
extending beyond the specific case in question. As I am well aware of this, I present 
all of the statements pertaining to a subset of informal international regimes as 
hypotheses for further testing and examination. Seeing that the AC represents a 
case of a regime dealing with issues of environmental protection and sustainable 
development, testing those observations in cases of other environmental informal 
regimes would be a natural starting point, which could be followed by extending 
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the inquiry into other issue areas of international politics, for instance trade—as is 
also suggested by findings drawn from studies of formal international regimes. My 
hope is that the conceptualization presented in this work will invite further research 
on informal international regimes. Ultimately, the arguments I have put forward in 
this dissertation can be best evaluated only through the analysis of other concrete 
cases of informal arrangements. Conversely, it will be through the application of 
these arguments to real life that the concept of informal international regimes and 
its propositions can be corroborated, further refined, and elaborated. 
There is another limitation, concerning the overall approach I adopted in my 
work, that is worth noting. In brief, it concerns the situation of this study within the 
overarching rationalist framework, particularly apparent in Article 1 and its direct 
references to the rational design of international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson, 
& Snidal, 2001), but also throughout most of this thesis. While there is nothing 
ill-suited in this decision, and quite a few studies of environmental governance have 
relied essentially on one research approach, deliberately choosing between rationalist 
and constructivist perspectives (Underdal, 2008), such a choice obviously also has 
certain ramifications. In regard to the rational design of international institutions, 
I find particularly perceptive the remarks of Wendt, who wrote that “[p]erhaps even 
more important than knowledge about what works is knowledge about what is 
right and wrong. After all, institutions are created to advance certain values, and so 
we cannot design anything until we know what values we should pursue” (Wendt, 
2001: 422). Even if, as he notes, a division of labour between positive and normative 
theory has its merits and is frequently useful, he also postulates a need to broaden 
our conception of social science to integrate positive and normative concerns in both 
its everyday applications and its theoretical deliberations.1 As much as this is an issue 
that extends far beyond the scope of this thesis, I find that the consideration of values 
and ends we seek to promote through international cooperation is fundamentally 
important to the inquiry on informal international regimes, and I hope that research 
that might follow would ultimately pursue this more integrative approach. 
1  The interesting advances along those lines could be observed within the Earth System Governance 
project and research agenda (Biermann, 2014).
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2. REGIMES AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE
“It is man’s earth now. 
One wonders what obligations may accompany this infinite possession.”
Fairchild Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (1948)
As the major contribution of this thesis lies in the field of international relations, and 
more specifically regime theory, the aim of this chapter is to present a brief overview 
of the history of thinking related to environmental regimes and its evolution toward 
global environmental governance.
2.1. Foundations of Regime Theory
Regime theory was launched in the 1970s and gained momentum during the 
1980s. It came about partly as a reaction to the formalism of mainstream work 
on international organizations (Breitmeier et al., 2006), partly as a response to 
the intellectual challenge posed by the study of collective-action problems, and in 
part as a response to the political challenge associated with an apparent decline in 
the ability of the United States to function as a dominant actor in international 
society (Keohane, 1984; Young, 1999). While at first the concept of the regime was 
“a handy device for organizing a mass of observations about working arrangements 
in a stateless social system (that is, international society)” (Young, 1989: Preface), 
regime theory soon developed into a vibrant research field and has since then 
grown into a major movement among analysts focused on international relations 
(Breitmeier et al., 2006). 
As an offshoot of the literature on interdependence (Ruggie, 1975; Keohane & 
Nye, 1977; Young, 1980  in: Stokke, 2012), regime theory addresses and seeks to 
solve a central research puzzle that can be posed as follows: “how is it possible for 
utility-maximizing actors to cooperate effectively under conditions of interactive 
decision making where there are incentives to cheat but no central political authority 
of the sort we would think of as a government?” (Young, 1999: 189), consequently 
highlighting and centering around the idea of “governance without government” 
(Young, 1997).
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2.2. Governance – From Institutions to Regimes
In the most ordinary sense of the word, governance refers to the various means used 
to shape and steer society towards desirable outcomes, and away from undesirable 
ones (Young, 2008, 2012b, 2017b). Governance arises as a matter of public concern 
whenever the members of a social group find that they are interdependent (Young, 
1997: 3). It involves the establishment and operation of social institutions – in other 
words, sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that 
serve to define social practices and to guide the interactions of those participating 
in these practices in order to grapple with collective problems (North, 1990; Young, 
1994). As much as institutions play a wide variety of roles and are necessary factors 
for the supply of governance, they are also not the only ones. Belief systems, norms, 
culture, and a sense of community serve, alongside institutions, as mechanisms 
guiding the behaviour of actors towards collectively desirable outcomes. Often, 
they also serve as the fabric by means of which institutions are interwoven and 
the sociocultural environment whose character conditions the performance of 
institutions (Young, 2008: 15). In this sense, regimes represent the institutions 
embedded in the overarching institutional arrangements that determine the 
identity of the major actors and configure the deep structure of the broader social 
environment (Breitmeier et al., 2006).
2.3. Wrangles about Defining ‘Regime’
Social institutions arise in many settings and address a wide range of issues. 
In order to distinguish these from the more fundamental framework structures 
of international society, the term regime was introduced to refer to arrangements 
created in response to the demand for governance in specific functionally or 
spatially defined areas. 
In defining regimes, a widely accepted starting point is Krasner’s (1983b: 2) 
conceptualization of regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in 
a given area”. The concept was, however, initially subjected to debate, primarily 
with respect to ways of identifying and specifying international regimes. Whereas 
the so-called “thinliners” argue in favour of operational clarity and claimed that 
international regimes are to be identified on the basis of explicit rules and procedures, 
the “thickliners” insist on including also state practices and observed behaviours, from 
which relevant rules, norms, and principles can be inferred (Stokke, 2012).2 The two 
2  For major accounts of the evolution of regime theory throughout the 1980s and 1990s, see Krasner, 
1983a; Rittberger, 1993.
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approaches involve important epistemological differences and consequently invite 
different methodologies for describing and analyzing regimes. 
Overall, regime theory has proven to be an umbrella broad enough to encompass 
both sets of preferences and to accommodate a wide range of theoretical perspectives, 
from positivists to constructivists (Breitmeier et al., 2006: 2). What they all shared is 
issue specificity and – originally – state centrism (Stokke, 2012). Furthermore, they 
all draw a clear distinction between regimes treated as institutions and organizations 
understood as material entities possessing offices, budgets, personnel, and often 
legal personality (Young, 1999: 7). Put simply, if “regimes provide the rules of 
the game, organizations typically emerge as actors pursuing their objectives under 
the terms of these rules” (Breitmeier et al., 2006: 4). The key issue in making this 
distinction concerns the role that social institutions, in contrast to organizations 
or governments, can play in the onset and impact as well as in the alleviating and 
resolving of collective-action problems (Young, 1997). Treating regimes as social 
institutions naturally places regime theory within the overarching milieu of “new 
institutionalism” (Young, 2008; Young, King, & Schroeder, 2008). 
2.4. The Variety of Regimes 
Regimes can and do vary along many dimensions, first and foremost, with respect 
to their geographic coverage, membership, and functional scope. They vary too in 
terms of their decision-making procedures, revenue sources, and their degree of 
formalization, which extends from legally binding instruments to various forms 
of “soft law” foundations (Young, 1999). Regimes can perform numerous tasks: 
regulatory, procedural, programmatic, and generative, or various combinations 
thereof. Even if there is a pronounced tendency to think of regimes primarily in 
regulatory terms, other tasks often play a substantive role in leading to the creation 
of regimes and in their operation (Young, 2011a). Likewise, for the most part, the 
formal or official members of regimes are states and states have accordingly been 
central actors in the analysis of regimes (Baldwin, 1993; Keohane & Martin, in: 
Stokke, 2012). There is, however, nothing out of the ordinary about regimes which 
have principal members that are not states – the emergence and advances of new 
actors beyond central governments have been recognized and noted by regime 
scholars (Pattberg, 2012).
The regime-theoretic approach has been applied to a wide range of issue areas, 
from human rights through arms control to trade and monetary concerns. The field, 
however, where the theory has taken root with particular vigour is international 
environmental politics. While the ranks of international regimes have, in general, 
grown in the decades following the close of World War II, it was environmental 
issues that triggered some of the most innovative approaches to and experiments 
36
Smieszek: Informal International Regimes
with new forms of governance (Von Moltke, 1997). “Whereas the Cold War bred 
an intense desire to protect and preserve existing institutions in other issue areas, 
the concurrently emerging environmental agenda prompted a growing awareness of 
the need for new arrangements that would foster sustainable human/environment 
relations” (Young, 1997: 2). The result has been the institutionalization of 
international environmental policy-making and the growth of functionally 
specific regimes to deal with an array of matters, such as marine pollution, fisheries 
management, migratory and endangered species, and ozone depletion. Accordingly, 
the term environmental and resource regimes has been adopted to refer to institutions 
that address issues relating to natural resources and the environment, both as regards 
managing human uses of renewable and nonrenewable resources and managing 
anthropogenic pollutants and human actions affecting biophysical systems (Young, 
2008, 2017b).
2.5. Studies of Regimes Formation
Hundreds of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have been signed 
over the last decades. Even if the varying methodologies used for counting MEAs 
result in different numbers, the proliferation of such agreements has become a key 
characteristic of the existing environmental governance system (Kanie, 2018). To 
offer an indication of the scale of this phenomenon: the Ecolex project sponsored by 
the United Nations Environment Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
recognizes a total of 519 environmental treaties (ibid.), other research has identified 
more than 500 MEAs registered with the United Nations, and it is estimated that in 
the 1990s some 20 to 30 multilateral and bilateral agreements were signed per year 
(Mitchell, 2003). 
The focus of the research community has closely mirrored these political 
developments. During the 1980s and early in the 1990s, analysts focused primarily 
on the previously mentioned conceptual questions relating to the definition and 
identification of individual regimes, and they directed attention to issues pertaining 
to the formation of international regimes, seeking to explain the conditions in 
which efforts to form regimes designed to deal with specific problems succeed or 
fail (Haas, 1990; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Krasner, 1983a; Litfin, 
1994; Ostrom, 1990; Young & Osherenko, 1993). In the 1990s, there was a shift 
to studies of regime effectiveness and performance that resulted in a voluminous 
literature on the subject. The interest in these aspects arose partly in response to 
those who considered regimes to be merely “epiphenomena” and deprived them of 
any causal significance (Mearsheimer, 1994; Strange, 1983), partly perhaps because, 
around that time, “a significant number of MEAs [had] existed long enough to 
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warrant investigation as to whether they have made a difference” (Steinar, 2013: 
307). Several large-scale international study projects examined numerous cases 
of environmental regimes, focusing on various aspects relating to regimes – their 
functions (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993); the behavioural mechanisms through 
which regimes influence actors’ behaviour (Young, Levy, and Osherenko), 1999); 
the classification of problem types addressed by a regime as malign or benign (Miles 
et al., 2002); and methodological challenges and analytic obstacles in examining 
regimes’ effectiveness (Underdal & Young, 2004). Other works included Levy, 
Young, & Zürn (1995); Stokke & Vidas (1996); Brown Weiss & Jacobson (1998), 
Young et al. (2008), and most recently, Stokke (2012), who proposes a novel, 
disaggregated approach to examining the effectiveness of the Barents Sea fisheries 
regime. While the lion’s share of these employed qualitative methods, primarily 
through in-depth case studies, scholars have also created the International Regimes 
Database that allows for the adoption of a quantitative approach to analyzing and 
comparing international regimes (Breitmeier, Underdal, & Young, 2011; Breitmeier 
et al., 2006). 
 
2.6. The Effectiveness of Regimes
Studies of the effectiveness of international regimes largely evolved from viewing 
them in terms of compliance and in terms of the implementation of international 
commitments in domestic laws to comprehending effectiveness as the extent to 
which regimes channel actors’ behaviours to eliminate or ameliorate the problem 
that led to their formation (Young, 1999) – a definition that can be designated a 
political approach to regime effectiveness (Young et al., 1999). As highlighted by 
Young and colleagues (1999), because regimes are not actors in their own rights, 
they affect the content of collective outcomes in international society via various 
causal pathways and mechanisms that can be captured in three general categories of 
cognition, obligation, and utility maximization (Stokke, 2001, 2007b). Since efforts 
to evaluate regimes’ effectiveness have been fraught with methodological challenges, 
in order to facilitate their measuring, the distinction was introduced between the 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts of a regime (Young, 2004). Accordingly, the study 
of outputs focuses on regimes’ rules and regulations, their ratification, and other 
formal steps of implementation, and as such is often engaged in by legal scholars. 
The study of outcomes in turn deals with measurable changes in the behaviour of 
regime members and those subject to their jurisdiction; while the study of impacts 
considers the consequences of a regime as these are defined in terms of change in 
the biophysical environment itself and the actual extent to which the regime has 
been able to alleviate the problem it was set up to deal with (Underdal, 2004). 
Concurrently, it is vital to recognize that the further we move along this chain, the 
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more challenging it becomes to separate the signal of regime effects from the “noise” 
arising from the impact of a wide range of other sources that are in operation at the 
same time as a regime (Young, 2001); thus, assessing the effectiveness of a regime 
becomes increasingly demanding. 
Whereas some scholars proposed a single comprehensive measure to assess regimes’ 
effectiveness, ranging between the non-regime counterfactual and the collective 
optimum (Helm & Sprinz, 2000; Hovi, Sprinz, & Underdal, 2003; Underdal, 
2002b), others have expressed doubts about the suitability of such an approach. 
They pointed to, inter alia, paramount difficulties in establishing the causality in 
relation to a regime and the observed effects, and even greater pitfalls in determining 
the proportion of factors, such as economic, political, and technological forces, in 
accounting for the observed change (Young, 2001, 2003). What all experts agree on, 
however, and what became clear from the evidence produced by empirical studies, 
is that - against the scepticism of realism-oriented pundits (Mearsheimer, 1994; 
Strange, 1983) – regimes do matter, and they make a positive difference, even if they 
usually fall short of providing functionally optimal solutions (Underdal, 2002a). 
Likewise, there is also consensus among scholars that, in accounting for the regime’s 
performance, both institutional and non-institutional factors play a role (Steinar, 
2013: 316).
2.7.  Institutional Interplay
Whereas studies of regimes’ effectiveness have focused on the effects of individual 
institutions within their respective governance domains, studies of institutional 
interaction focus on the relationships among institutions, and the effects 
institutions have on one another (Oberthür & Gehring, 2011; Stokke & Oberthür, 
2011), which is part of the broader consequences that international institutions 
may have beyond their own domains (Underdal & Young, 2004). The question of 
institutional linkages arises again in relation to environmental concerns. The rise of 
institutional interplay3 as a research subject has to do with the growing density of 
the international institutional landscape in general, and with the rapidly increasing 
number of MEAs in particular. While few scholars initially expressed concern 
that “treaty congestion” (Brown Weiss, 1993: 679) could reduce the effectiveness 
of international environmental governance, later empirical studies reveal a more 
3 The terms “institutional interaction” and “institutional interplay” have been often used interchangeably 
(Stokke & Oberthür, 2011). When it comes to classification of institutional interaction, we distinguish 
between a horizontal interaction, which occurs among institutions located at the same level of social 
organization or at the same point on the administrative scale, and a vertical interaction, which addresses 
the influence of institutions across different levels of social organization or administration (Oberthür & 
Stokke, 2011; Young, 2002; Young et al., 2008).
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nuanced picture (Andresen, 2013) and point out that, in general, synergy, rather 
than disruption or negative effects of institutional interplay, prevails in international 
environmental governance (Gehring & Oberthür, 2006 in: Oberthür & Gehring, 
2011). Interestingly, the studies also show that “positive effects of institutional 
interaction are commonly ‘consumed’ without further action”, irrespective of the 
potential for further improvement that may exist and that may be worth exploring 
(Oberthür & Gehring, 2011: 32). In order to reap such benefits, relevant actors 
or group of actors would need to engage in interplay management – conscious 
efforts undertaken in whatever form or forum to address and improve institutional 
interaction and its effects (Stokke, 2001; Stokke & Oberthür, 2011). Interplay 
management, together with inquiries into institutional complexes – sets of 
institutions that co-govern a particular issue area – and into institutional change 
and dynamics have been among the latest additions to the literature on institutional 
dimensions of global environmental change (Young, 2010).4 
2.8. Towards Global Environmental Governance  
and a Governance Architecture 
In parallel with advances related to regime interplay, regimes clusters, and regime 
complexes, there is a growing body of research on global governance, highlighting 
– in contrast to traditional intergovernmental perspectives – the emergence of 
new actors and “agency beyond the state”, new mechanisms of transnational rule-
setting and implementation, new types of horizontal and vertical fragmentation 
and interlinkages in world politics (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012b), and cascading 
effects of regime shifts (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & Levin, 2018). Among the 
newly examined actors have been science and expert networks, global corporations 
and intergovernmental bureaucracies. With respect to mechanisms, there is the 
recognition that the increased participation of non-state actors has given rise to 
new forms of governance, such as transnational environmental regimes. The core 
difference between the transnational and international regimes is that in case of 
the former the non-governmental actors are the ones who generate the “principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which the expectations of 
actors converge in a given issue area” (Krasner, 1983b: 2). It follows that the norms 
4 A great part of research on international environmental institutions arose from the project on the 
Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC), which was one of the four core 
projects of the UN-affiliated International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental 
Change (IHDP). The IDGEC launched in 1999 and ended in 2007. Upon its finalization, the results of 
the project as well as identified directions for future research, combined with the findings of the Global 
Governance Project that operated approximately throughout the same time period, fed into the Earth 
System Governance Project that is now the core project of the IHDP (Young, 2002; Young et al., 2008).
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and rules of transnational environmental regimes are by default not legally binding, 
which opens an interesting path of inquiry into the effectiveness and performance 
of non-legally binding regimes in international society.  Research on these largely 
follows the structure of the debate pertaining to international interstate regimes that 
had been examined earlier (Pattberg, 2012). 
In focusing on non-state actors, the work on transnational environmental regimes 
complements the earlier regime literature that is predominantly dedicated to 
intergovernmental forms of cooperation among states. In doing so, it addresses one 
of the major criticisms of regime analysis which points to the theory’s predominantly 
state-centric approach and consequential focus on order and stability in world affairs 
(Stokke, 1997; Young, 1999). The original state-centrism of the theory was, in turn, 
dictated by the strong policy-oriented ambition of its creators, where generating 
policy advice and informing decision-makers in their efforts to address challenges 
related to governing human–environment relations was always front and centre 
of research on regimes and the institutional dimensions of global environmental 
change (Haas et al., 1993; Stokke, 1997; Young et al., 2008). 
Along with the increasing scale of the challenge of managing human–environment 
relations, much of interest of scholarly community has turned towards addressing 
questions of the governance of complex systems (Young, 2017b), earth system 
governance, and issues of governance architecture (Biermann, 2008, 2014). The 
recognition of the existence of compound linkages and interplay among institutions 
has shifted the debate towards the need to understand  the overall institutional 
framework of governance, “the entire interlocking web of widely shared principles, 
institutions, and practices that shape decisions by stakeholders at all levels in this 
field” (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012a: 274), that runs through all, or through a large 
number, of institutions and governance mechanisms. The study of an architecture 
defined in this manner has been recognized as central to all other dimensions of 
earth system governance as it is the architecture that describes the framework for the 
actions of agents, sets the rules for the accountability of those who govern, shapes 
the allocative outcomes, and determines the degree of adaptability of the overall 
system (Biermann, 2014: 81). 
Yet, while interest has turned towards examining the earth governance system in 
its entirety, towards addressing its deficiencies and improving its functionality, there 
is much still to be learned from additional research on the individual components 
and regimes within that system, where understanding the operations of hundreds of 
existing regimes and their interlinkages is ever more important (Biermann, 2008; 
Young, 2008). In other words, keeping in mind and advancing our comprehension of 
the larger system does not free us from the need to analyze smaller units of governance 
architecture, from examining their characteristics, specific roles, contributions, and 
patterns of change and dynamics. As this dissertation and the in-depth case study of 
the Arctic Council reveals, there is much to be learnt from the existing arrangements 
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that could inform our thinking on the range of mechanisms at our disposal vis-à-vis 
challenges related to the governance of complex systems. In many ways, the Arctic 
region – which is described in the next section – serves as a vivid illustration of the 
challenges and developments reflective of the rest of the globe. 
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3. THE ARCTIC 
“As goes the Arctic, so goes the world.” 
—Sheila-Watt Cloutier, Inuk leader and author
In several aspects, polar regions previously served as an arena for studies and advances 
in regime theory. The 1998 Science Plan of the Institutional Dimensions of Global 
Environmental Change (IDGEC) laid out three research foci for institutional 
research – causality, performance, and design; put forward three analytical themes – 
the problems of fit, interplay, and scale; and, in terms of physical location, suggested 
concentrating on Southeast Asia and the polar regions (Biermann, 2008). While 
much of scholarly attention has been dedicated to studying the Antarctic and the 
Antarctic Treaty System (Stokke & Vidas, 1996b), the Arctic has also served as a 
case in several studies on various aspects related to international regimes (Stokke, 
2011, 2013b; Stokke & Hønneland, 2007; Young, 1998, 2012c). 
The Arctic, unlike the opposite pole, is not the subject of a uniform legal regime, 
or even a precise, internationally agreed legal definition (Oppenheimer & Israel, 
2014). The Arctic is often delimited by the latitude of the Arctic Circle (66°32’N), 
which approximates the southern boundary of the midnight sun, and encompasses 
land territories of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the 
Russian Federation, and the United States (AMAP, 1998). There are, however, other 
definitions that set the Arctic’s boundaries elsewhere, depending on what is being 
studied (Osherenko & Young, 1989). On land, the tree line is the effective southern 
boundary of the Arctic. At sea, the boundary is approximately the maximum extent 
of sea ice (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 2013). The Arctic can 
be also defined according to sociological criteria, looking at shared human factors. In 
all instances, the Arctic encompasses an area of around 40 million square kilometres 
or about 8% of the surface of the Earth, with a human population of approximately 
four million, 10% of whom are indigenous, even if the relative shares of indigenous 
and non-indigenous populations in each circumpolar region differ significantly 
(Arctic Human Development Report, 2004). The Arctic spans a wide range of 
ecosystems and, as a whole, is a very diverse region with important differences in 
natural conditions and economic activities (AMAP, 2017b, 2017a; AHDR, 2004; 
Glomsrød, Duhaime, & Aslaksen, 2017; Hoel, 2015). 
Even if the Arctic has relatively low biodiversity, it is home to more than twenty-
one thousand known species of highly cold-adapted mammals, birds, fish, and plants 
(CAFF, 2013). Similarly, even though the Arctic Ocean is not known for extensive 
fisheries per se, the sub-Arctic and northern portions of adjacent seas have among 
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the largest fisheries in the world (Fluharty, 2012; Hoel & Vilhjamsson, 2005). 
As such, Arctic biological diversity, next to its intrinsic worth and irreplaceable 
cultural, scientific, and spiritual value, also provides innumerable services to people. 
At present, it is under increasing pressure from multiple stressors, such as industrial 
development, pollution, local disturbances, and invasive alien species, the impact of 
all of them exacerbated by climate change, which is by far the most serious threat to 
the region’s biodiversity (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 2013) 
and is the fundamental driver of Arctic transformation (ACIA, 2004). 
As result of human-induced climate change, the Arctic has been warming more 
than twice as rapidly as the world as a whole for the past 50 years and, today, driven 
by quickly rising temperatures, it is shifting to a new state, with a warmer, wetter, and 
more variable environment (AMAP, 2017c). Among identified shifts in the Arctic – 
large, relatively abrupt, and mostly irreversible changes in the structure and function 
of social-ecological systems – are the accelerating loss of Arctic sea ice, the Greenland 
ice-sheet collapse, the greening of the Arctic, and thermohaline circulation, all of 
which may have very substantial impacts on countries and communities worldwide 
(Arctic Council, 2016; Sommerkorn & Hassol, 2009; Young, 2012b). 
As dramatic as they are in biophysical terms, the recession of Arctic sea ice and 
the consequent opening of the Arctic Ocean and its subjacent areas has triggered 
interest on the part of private actors and non-Arctic states attracted by prospects 
of commercial shipping through Arctic waters, access to the region’s oil and energy 
resources, and the potential for industrial fisheries and for ship-based tourism 
(Howard, in Young, 2012b). The shorter distances offered by Arctic sea routes 
make them attractive alternatives to the southern routes, and according to the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Arctic may hold approximately 30% 
of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves 
(United States Geological Survey, 2008). Yet, whether, in what form, and at what 
scale developments in these fields occur, or will occur, is primarily dictated by global 
economic forces, resulting in increasing globalization of the previously fairly self-
contained region with a distinct policy agenda. The Arctic today is increasingly 
affected by outside environmental, economic, and geopolitical developments, 
while the impact of Arctic climate change is increasingly felt throughout the mid-
latitudes, further tightening the connections between the region and the wider world 
(Heininen & Southcott, 2010; Keil & Knecht, 2017; National Research Council, 
2014; Overland et al., 2015; Stone, 2015; Young, 2012a). 
The unprecedented transformational character and pace of change in the Arctic 
have resulted in high levels of uncertainty about both the causes and consequences 
of developments unfolding in the region, making forecasts or projections even over 
the next 5–10 years challenging and ambiguous (AMAP, 2017b; Corell, Kim, Kim, 
& Young, 2017). Among the few things that can be stated with certainty is that 
the drivers of many changes in the Arctic, including climate change, pollution, and 
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demand for the region’s resources, originate in the lower latitudes and come from 
non-Arctic actors, making it essential to include them in a governance equation 
aimed at addressing challenges ahead of the North. This, in turn, precludes dealing 
with the Arctic, as in the early days of circumpolar collaboration, as a region separate 
from global matters.5 Rather, present developments and the overall state of affairs 
put a premium on fora and solutions that are able to account for the rights of Arctic 
rightsholders, stakeholders, and various groups with interests in the circumpolar 
North. In many respects, the Arctic – much like the rest of the planet – exhibits the 
characteristics of a complex system. Advancing globalization makes it impossible to 
isolate regional occurrences from the interplay of forces operating in the world at 
large. The linkages among the various components of the Arctic’s large and dynamic 
socioecological system effectively preclude dealing with issues arising in isolation 
from one another. Finally, the phenomenon of teleconnections, where forces 
operating in one part of the Earth’s system can trigger unintended consequences 
in distant parts of the system – such as the effect of Arctic warming on weather 
patterns in the mid-latitudes – all point to the need to view Arctic governance in 
terms of the governance of a complex system (Young, 2012b, 2017b).
In attending to such circumstances, cooperation is key. 
5 According to Oran Young, the Arctic in the last three decades has experienced two fundamental 
state changes, each of them having major consequences for Arctic policymaking and governance in more 
broader terms. The first change, ‘a delinking or decoupling shift’, took place in the late 1980s/early 1990s 
and was closely linked to the waning of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It resulted in 
the launch of numerous formalized structures of collaboration, was marked by a strong focus on Arctic-
specific matters and allowed for the gradual development of ‘the idea of the Arctic as a distinctive region 
with a policy agenda of its own’. At the same time this process brought also a disconnection between 
Arctic governance and the governance unfolding on a global scale. The second state change, ‘a linking 
change’, began in the Arctic in the early 2000s and continues until today. As illustrated in this section, it 
has been to a large extent driven by processes of global environmental change and globalization – in other 
words, a mix of forces of environmental and socioeconomic character (Young, 2009a, 2009b).
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4. ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 
“If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.”
African proverb
4.1.  The Overview of Arctic Governance
Where there is governance, there is usually also cooperation (Durfee & Johnstone, 
2019: 5). The Arctic has a long history of ingenious local, bilateral, transnational, 
and international forms of collaboration as well as responses to the demands 
of governance in the region. Historically, Arctic lands have been populated by 
indigenous peoples who used their maritime and terrestrial resources in a sustainable 
manner and developed systems of social practices, many of which prevail to this day 
(Arctic Governance Project, 2010; Shadian, 2014). The Treaty Concerning the 
Archipelago of Spitsbergen, concluded in 1920 and still in force today, represents 
a case of sovereignty innovation, in terms of which Norwegian sovereignty over 
the islands is recognized in return for granting all parties equal access to the 
archipelago’s natural resources, facilitating scientific research, and establishing an 
equitable administrative system, in terms of which any party to the treaty can send 
its nationals to the islands for peaceful purposes (Byers, 2013; Durfee & Johnstone, 
2019). 
While the Cold War turned the Arctic into a theatre of military operations 
between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies, cooperative 
developments have begun to take place in the region on a smaller scale since 
1950s. In 1956, the Nordic Sami Council was established to promote the rights of 
Sami people in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and set a precedent for formalized 
indigenous cross-border collaboration in the North. In 1973, five Arctic Ocean 
coastal states, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Soviet Union, and the United States, 
signed the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, which was not only the 
first multilateral cooperative arrangement during the Cold War, but has since then 
been furthered by several management agreements between the United States and 
Canadian indigenous governments, and by the agreement on the conservation and 
management of the Alaska-Chukotka polar bear population signed by the United 
States and Russia in 2000 (Byers, 2013; Durfee & Johnstone, 2019; Oppenheimer 
& Israel, 2014). In another demonstration of cooperation across the Cold War 
divide, in 1975, Norway and the Soviet Union signed the first in a series of bilateral 
agreements that formed the basis of the Barents Sea fisheries regime (Stokke, 2012; 
Stokke, Anderson, & Mirovitskaya, 1999). Furthermore, as an expression of Inuit 
activism and unity, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (later Council) (ICC) was 
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founded in 1977 to represent the Inuit of Canada, Alaska, Greenland, and – since 
1989 – of the now former Soviet Union (Keskitalo, 2004), laying the ground for what 
would become one of the most innovative features of circumpolar collaboration, the 
high-level engagement of indigenous representatives in the Arctic Council (English, 
2013; Wilson Rowe, 2018; Young, 2016b).
While the above examples illustrate that cooperation in the Arctic is not new, 
its scope has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War, sparked by 
the seminal “Arctic zone of peace” speech of Mikhail Gorbachev, the then General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered in Murmansk in 
October 1987. The speech commenced a period of “cooperative Olympics in the 
Arctic” (Hønneland & Stokke, 2007), which resulted in the formation of several 
bodies of paramount importance to collaboration on northern affairs, including 
the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) (Rogne, Rachold, Hacquebord, & 
Corell, 2015; Smieszek, 2017a; Stokke & Hønneland, 2007). The emergence of 
these arrangements, which involved not only states, but also non-state actors and 
sub-national units, and reflected various forms of interstate and international 
engagement, led concurrently to the emergence of the Arctic as a distinct region in 
international society (Keskitalo, 2004; Young, 2000). 
As noted by Rowe (2018: 8-9), the “compelling political nature of the Arctic 
– its indigenous sovereignties meeting state governance, management of a rapidly 
changing physical environment, and of intersecting national boundaries and 
transnational ecosystems, resources, and legal regimes” has attracted a good deal of 
scholarly attention, with contributions to research on cross-boundary relations in 
the Arctic coming from many different angles and fields of social science. Academic 
production on the theme of Arctic governance has significantly expanded, especially 
over the last decade (Pelaudeix, 2015). The field is very diverse with respect to the 
analytical frameworks adopted, levels of governance examined, and issue areas 
selected. It has dealt with, among others, questions pertaining to the governance 
of sub-state units and territories (Loukacheva, 2007); developing the policies and 
strategies of Arctic states (Arnaudo, 2010; A. J. Bailes & Heininen, 2012; Griffiths, 
Huebert, & Lackenbauer, 2011; Hønneland, 2016; Wilson Rowe, 2013; Zysk, 
2015); the approaches of non-Arctic actors, including Asian countries (Corell et 
al., 2017; Timo Koivurova et al., 2019; Lunde, Yang, & Stensdal, 2016; Shibata, 
Zou, Sellheim, & Scopelliti, 2019) and the European Union (Keil & Raspotnik, 
2014; Liu, Kirk, & Henriksen, 2017; Raspotnik, 2018; Stepien, Koivurova, & 
Kankaanpää, 2015; Wegge, 2012); indigenous Arctic governance, and the claims 
and rights of Arctic indigenous peoples (Cambou, 2018; Fondahl & Irlbacher-
Fox, 2009; Shadian, 2014). There is a voluminous literature on international law 
and frameworks relevant to the Arctic (Eichbaum, 2013; Haftendorn, 2013; E.J. 
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Molenaar, 2012; Erik J. Molenaar, 2017; Stokke, 2013a, 2015; Young, 2012c) and 
to its marine areas (Baker & Yeager, 2015; Franckx, 2010; Hoel, 2009a, 2009b, 
2014; Koivurova & Molenaar, 2010; PAME, 2013; Rothwell, 1996; Young, 2011b, 
2016a). Likewise, much attention has been paid to maritime boundaries within the 
region (Byers, 2013; Franckx, 1993; McDorman & Schofield, 2015); as well as to 
regulations and developments related to Arctic shipping (Arctic Council, 2009; 
Beckman, Henriksen, Kraabel, Molenaar, & Roach, 2017; Moe & Stokke, 2019; 
Rothwell, 2018); Arctic oil and gas, with particular focus on offshore extraction 
(Basse & Pelaudeix, 2017; Humrich, 2013; Johnstone, 2015; Keil, 2014; Offerdal, 
2007); Arctic security (Kraska, 2013; Tamnes & Offerdal, 2016); Arctic climate 
governance (Duyck, 2015; Hasanat, 2012; Hoel, 2007; Koivurova, Keskitalo, & 
Bankes, 2009; Shapovalova, 2016); Arctic fisheries (Harsem & Hoel, 2012; Pan & 
Huntington, 2016; Stokke, 2017; Weidemann, 2014), and seals regimes (Cambou, 
2013; Sellheim, 2014, 2015). 
Amidst all these discussions the Arctic Council, “the foremost of the Arctic-specific 
international institutions” (Stokke, 2015: 331), has garnered a particularly high level 
of attention. In the years since 1996, when the Arctic Council was established by 
means of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Declaration on 
the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996, hereafter the Ottawa Declaration), the 
scope and reach of the AC has expanded significantly, far exceeding the expectations 
of those who negotiated its provisions and observed its convoluted beginnings 
(English, 2013; Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Koivurova, 2009; Young, 1998). 
As the evolution, performance, and role that the Arctic Council plays, are central 
to the focus of this dissertation and to the elaboration of the concept of informal 
international regimes, it is important here to present an overview of the council’s 
history from its beginnings to the present day. At the same time, it needs to be noted 
that parts of the content of the section below are also included in the articles in this 
dissertation. Thus, there is a certain degree of unavoidable overlap between them.6  
4.2.  The History and Structure of the Arctic Council 
In order to grasp the history of the Arctic Council, it is important to begin with 
its direct predecessor, the first circumpolar cooperative initiative launched by 
Finland towards the end of the 1980s. The previously mentioned Murmansk speech 
of Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he called for making the Arctic a zone of peace 
through, among others things, collaboration to protect its natural environment, 
induced Finland to convene a meeting of all eight Arctic states in 1989 to discuss 
6 The Article 4, in particular, focuses on the changes that have taken place in the Council since its 
inception. Accordingly, it also provides their most detailed account that is not included in this part. 
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the prospects for such cooperation – an initiative that, after two years of intensive 
diplomatic efforts, led to the signing of the Declaration on the Protection of Arctic 
Environment and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 in 
Rovaniemi, Finland. The strategy aimed to develop environmental monitoring in the 
region, deepen scientific understanding of pollution in the Arctic, and continuously 
assess threats to fragile northern ecosystems (AEPS, 1991). In order to achieve those 
objectives, the strategy established four working groups: the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), 
Emergency, Preparedness, Prevention and Response (EPPR) and Protection of 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). Each working group was tasked with realizing 
its individual mandate and was given substantial autonomy to develop and conduct 
its programmatic activities (Nilson, 1997; Young, 1998). The AEPS promptly began 
to operationalize itself and to work on its first projects and assessments, including 
the major 1997/1998 deliverable, which not only provided critical information on 
Arctic pollution issues, but also established a lasting precedent for assessments that 
would consequently become the hallmark of the AEPS and later the Arctic Council 
(AMAP, 1998; Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Stone, 2015). 
The limited focus of the AEPS on selected environmental issues was criticized 
from the onset for insufficient inclusion and consideration of the human dimension 
of the Arctic within its activities. Canada in particular, because of its large indigenous 
population and the high profile of northern issues on its domestic political agenda, 
was an active proponent of establishing a new multilateral decision-making 
organization with wide-ranging authority that would also attend to other matters 
such as sustainable development in the North (Smieszek, 2019). Not all Arctic 
parties, however, shared this view and the Unites States in particular fiercely opposed 
the creation of any new international organization. The US made its consent for a 
new body contingent upon setting up the council as a purely consultative forum 
with few mutual obligations (Scrivener 1999: 55). Ultimately, the United States 
agreed to the formation of an institution small in scale, without legal personality, a 
permanent budget, chair or secretariat – a minimalist version of what had been earlier 
envisaged (Bloom, 1999; English, 2013; Scrivener, 1999). The Arctic Council was 
established on 19 September 1996 as a high-level forum to promote “cooperation, 
coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the 
Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic 
issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection 
in the Arctic” (Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). Like 
its predecessor, the AEPS, it was adopted by means of a declaration, rather than as 
a treaty, thus reflecting the political – but not a legal – commitment of eight Arctic 
states to circumpolar collaboration (Bloom, 1999).
In addition to the category of members of the Arctic Council – reserved 
exclusively for Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the 
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Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States – the Ottawa Declaration 
provided for the categories of permanent participants (PPs) and observers. The 
former has been an innovative and largely unprecedented arrangement in terms of 
which organizations that represent either one people living in many Arctic states or 
many indigenous peoples living in one Arctic state must, as PPs, be fully consulted 
by AC member states before consensual decision-making (Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). The rules stipulate that, at all times, the 
number of PPs must be smaller than the number of AC members, and today the 
Council has six PPs. The latter category, observers, is reserved for non-Arctic states, 
global and regional intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, and 
non-governmental organizations “that the Council determines can contribute to its 
work” (Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996). In accordance 
with the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure, the primary role of observers is to 
observe the work of the Arctic Council, and they are expected to contribute and 
engage predominantly at the level of the Arctic Council’s working groups (Arctic 
Council, 2013a).  Originally, there were 14 observers present at the signing ceremony 
of the declaration in Ottawa in 1996, and nine were originally listed in the annex to 
the AC’s first rules of procedure in 1998 (Arctic Council, 1998). Today, there are 39 
observers to the council, representing a varied group of actors, including states such 
as China, India, and Japan, and organizations such as the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the University of the Arctic (UArctic), and 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). In 
addition, the group includes also the EU, which, despite the lack of formal title, is 
recognized as a de facto observer to the AC. All decisions of the Arctic Council and 
its subsidiary bodies are taken by consensus among all eight Arctic Council member 
states (Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).
When the Arctic Council was formed, it subsumed the four working groups of the 
AEPS, complemented by the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), 
created in 1998, and later by a sixth working group, the Arctic Contaminants Action 
Program (ACAP) established in 2006. While the Ottawa Declaration marked a 
shift in focus for Arctic cooperation from environmental protection alone toward 
a broader concept of sustainable development, there was nevertheless considerable 
disagreement among the Arctic states over the meaning and definition of the 
concept of sustainable development (Keskitalo, 2004; Tennberg, 1999). As a result, 
instead of adopting a comprehensive programme of action, it was decided at the AC 
ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Canada, in 1998 that the sustainable development 
programme would be comprised of a series of specific projects (Bloom, 1999).7 
7 Only in 2017 the Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic Council had its first 
Strategic Framework developed and approved (Smieszek, 2019).
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It was also in Iqaluit that the Arctic states adopted, after two years of protracted 
negotiations, the AC rules of procedure (Arctic Council, 1998). 
During much of its first decade in operation, while the Arctic remained largely on 
the sidelines of the mainstream foreign and national politics in most Arctic countries 
(Smieszek & Koivurova, 2017), the council operated mostly as a science rather than 
as a policy forum. The bulk of the council’s work revolved around the conducting of 
scientific assessments of the state of and change in the Arctic environment and human 
development in the region, including the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) 
(ACIA, 2004), the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) (Arctic Human 
Development Report, 2004), reports on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and 
the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (Arctic Council, 2009). It was the 
seminal ACIA that, when it was released, established the Arctic as a prime location 
of global climate change, one which is likely to warm twice as fast as the rest of the 
planet, with profound consequences for humans and ecosystems in the region and 
beyond. Accordingly, the ACIA contributed to shifting the image of the Arctic from 
a “frozen desert” to the one of “Arctic in change” (Fenge, 2013; Koivurova, 2009; 
Stone, 2015), a trend that was further intensified by a series of events that received 
unparalleled attention from the media, the public, and government decision-makers 
worldwide. These events included the widely reported planting of the Russian flag 
on the seafloor at the North Pole in August 2007 and a record decrease in the extent 
of the Arctic sea-ice in September of the same year (NSIDC, 2007). Furthermore, as 
previously mentioned, in 2008, the USGS published estimates which stated that the 
Arctic may hold up to 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves (United 
States Geological Survey, 2008). This was followed by the announcement that the 
Arctic Ocean could become ice-free in summer as early as between 2030 and 2100 
(NSIDC, 2009). The world’s attention was further drawn to the North by a media 
frenzy regarding possible geopolitical tensions, alleged emerging conflicts over 
Arctic resources, and prospects of new economic opportunities in the increasingly 
accessible Arctic Ocean (Borgerson, 2008; Graff, 2007; Young, 2009b, 2009c). 
All of these events combined translated into much greater interest in Arctic affairs 
expressed by an increasing number of non-Arctic actors. Many of them submitted 
their applications for observer status within the council, some also raised questions 
about the adequacy of the existing Arctic governance structures vis-à-vis challenges 
faced by the region (European Parliament, 2008; Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014; 
Koivurova, 2009). One of the challenges to the AC in fact originated with several 
Arctic states, when, in May 2008, representatives of Canada, Denmark (Greenland), 
Norway, Russia, and the United States (the so-called Arctic Five) met in Ilulissat, 
Greenland, to reassert their exclusive legal sovereign rights and obligations as coastal 
states of the Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). Whereas the intention of Arctic 
Ocean coastal states was to stymie debate about the need for a new comprehensive 
international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean, the excluded members of 
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the Arctic Council – Iceland, Finland, and Sweden – and the PPs argued against a 
new forum as one that would impede existing formats and patterns of circumpolar 
collaboration and exclude long-term partners and Arctic indigenous peoples from 
discussions. As a consequence, the Ilulissat meeting not only raised tensions among 
Arctic actors and states, but it also cast temporary doubt on the Arctic Council as a 
preeminent forum for matters pertaining to the Arctic (Pedersen, 2012).
With these concerns as background, the Arctic Council, which, until its 10th 
anniversary in 2006, was used to operating away from the limelight and on the 
peripheries of the world’s international relations, set out on a path of internal 
reforms and adjustments to face the challenges of rapid Arctic transformation. As 
mentioned above, all these reforms and other changes in the AC are discussed in 
greater detail in the Article 4 in this dissertation, therefore I list them here briefly 
only as an overview. 
Among the first efforts undertaken by the AC was the adjustment of its rules 
concerning the admission, role, and functions of observers. The AC agreed to 
the new and more specific criteria for observers in 2011, incorporated them into 
the revised rules of procedure adopted by the Arctic ministers at their meeting in 
Kiruna in 2013 (Arctic Council, 2011, 2013a, 2013b), and admitted new states and 
organizations as observers at the ministerial meetings in 2013, 2017, and in 2019 
(Arctic Council, 2013b, 2017). In 2011 too, the Arctic ministers decided at their 
meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, to establish a standing Arctic Council Secretariat 
(ACS). This was accomplished in Tromsø, Norway, in 2013 (Arctic Council, 
2011, 2013b). Finally, the AC ministerial meeting in 2011 became a milestone in 
the council’s history when Arctic ministers signed there the first legally binding 
circumpolar agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic (the SAR Agreement).8 The SAR Agreement was followed by the 
8 To many such was the significance of the SAR Agreement that it marked a new phase in the Council’s 
development. As previously mentioned, there are various conceptions of how developments in the Arctic 
and in the AC could be divided on the timeline (see fn.5). To complement the account offered by Young 
with respect to the Arctic region itself, in Conley’s geopolitical perspective, two significant shifts that 
the Arctic has experienced in the most recent history were both centred upon Russia. While the first one 
came, like to Young, with the collapse of the USSR, the second geopolitical shift occurred with a return 
of geopolitical tensions that followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Conley & Melino, 
2016). In turn, regarding the formalized Arctic cooperation, its earlier accounts habitually emphasized its 
phase by phase development, with the first phase commenced with the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy in 1991, the second marked by foundation of the Council in 1996, and with the promoted – but 
not materialized - third, where the soft-law basis of the AC would be replaced with a hard-law instrument 
and the Council would turn into a full-fledged international organization (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015). 
In contrast, Rottem proposes a division of the Council’s history according to the AC’s main areas of focus 
in the given period: Arctic pollution from 1996 to the mid-2000s, climate change in the early 2000s, and 
finally, ‘in recent years’ responding to the growing interest and potential for activity in the region (Rottem, 
2015). 
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second one, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic (the Oil Spills Agreement)9, signed at the ministerial 
meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013. A third agreement, on enhancing international 
scientific cooperation in the region, was concluded at the AC ministerial meeting in 
Fairbanks, Alaska, in May 2017. Since the Arctic Council has no independent legal 
personality, none of these agreements are in reality “Arctic Council’s agreements”, 
and the council served mainly as a catalyst for their launch and a forum for their 
negotiation. Nonetheless, despite this and the fact that the agreements are more 
capacity-enhancement rather than norm-making mechanisms, their signing was 
met with much enthusiasm and anticipation in relation to the council moving from 
a policy-shaping to become a policy-making body (Kao, Pearre, & Firestone, 2012; 
Smieszek, 2019; Stokke, 2013b).
All the legally-binding agreements came from the work of Arctic Council task 
forces, a new element that was added for the first time to the institutional architecture 
of the AC in 2009 and which, since then, has become its quasi-permanent element. 
Each task force has a specific mandate and aims to deliver concrete results within 
an assigned time frame. In addition to the task forces serving as vehicles for the 
negotiation of the aforementioned agreements, the Task Force to Facilitate the 
Circumpolar Business Forum laid the ground for the establishment of the Arctic 
Economic Council (AEC), the first in a series of specialized satellite bodies that 
have their roots in the AC and are expected to complement its work, yet operate 
independently from it. The grouping includes today the AEC, the Arctic Offshore 
Regulators Forum, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (see Molenaar, 2017).
The Arctic Council celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2016. Over the 
course of its twenty-year lifetime, it had undergone a transition from a low-profile 
regional institution known to only but a few, to an acclaimed primary forum for 
circumpolar and global cooperation on issues pertaining to the Arctic (Koivurova 
& Smieszek, 2016; Smieszek, 2019; Young, 2016b). It has significantly expanded its 
activities, structures and has become “a hub for a wide range of forms of circumpolar 
collaboration, from scientific and monitoring to political, legal, economic and to 
some extent security issues” (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015). At the same time, as the 
AC ministerial meeting in May 2019 in Rovaniemi, Finland, showed, the Arctic 
Council is no longer shielded, as it was the case in the past, from geopolitical tensions 
and global high politics, much like the Arctic and Arctic governance can be no longer 
viewed in separation from forces operating at a global scale. I argue that all these 
9 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (signed 
in Nuuk on 12 May 2011, entered into force 19 January 2013) 50 ILM 1119 (2011) (SAR Agreement); 
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed 
in Kiruna on 15 May 2013) <www.arctic-council.org/eppr> accessed 15 January 2017 (Oil Spills 
Agreement).
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developments render an in-depth inquiry into the AC, including drawing systematic 
insights from the council’s experiences and filling in the gaps in our comprehension 
of the body, of paramount importance not only to our understanding of the shifting 
landscape of Arctic governance (Young, 2016c), but also of, more broadly, global 
environmental governance. 
4.3.  Overview of Scholarship on the Arctic Council 
The central role of the Arctic Council in the Arctic institutional landscape has 
been well reflected in the prolific scholarship on the AC (Axworthy, Koivurova, 
& Hasanat, 2012; Fenge, 2013; Fenge & Funston, 2015; Heininen, Exner-Pirot, & 
Plouffe, 2016; Nord, 2016a; Rottem, 2016; Tennberg, 1999; UArctic, 2016) and its 
various aspects: scientific assessments of the council (Nilsson, 2007, 2012; Smieszek, 
Stepien, & Kankaanpää, 2016); the council’s contributions to international 
regulatory mechanisms (Brigham, 2014; Downie & Fenge, 2003; Khan, 2017; Prip, 
2016; Selin, 2014, 2017; Selin & Selin, 2008; Shapovalova, 2016; Stone, 2015); 
the role of indigenous peoples and the PPs in the AC (Dorough, 2019; Gamble 
& Shadian, 2017; Koivurova & Heinämäki, 2006; Sellheim, 2019); and the role 
of the AC observers (Graczyk, 2011, 2012; Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014; Graczyk, 
Smieszek, & Koivurova, 2016; Knecht, 2017b, 2017a; Smieszek & Kankaanpää, 
2015), including non-state actors (Burke & Bondaroff, 2019; Wehrmann, 2017). 
Moreover, much attention has been paid to the various roles of the Arctic Council 
(Bailes, 2013; Nilsson, 2012; Spence, 2017; Wilson, 2016); the AC’s role in 
environmental and marine governance, including ecosystem-based management 
(Hoel, 2015; E.J. Molenaar, 2012; Stokke, 2011, 2013b; Young, 2016a); and to new 
circumpolar agreements negotiated under the auspices of the council (Kao et al., 
2012; Rottem, 2015; Smieszek, 2017b). Finally, a question of leadership in the AC 
has received some treatment (Exner-Pirot, 2011; Nord, 2016b, 2019; Smieszek & 
Kankaanpää, 2015), as have lessons flowing from the history of Arctic collaborative 
efforts (Koivurova, Kankaanpaa, & Stepien, 2015; Koivurova, 2012; Stenlund, 
2002). 
Among Arctic pundits and practitioners, there is a broad consensus that the Arctic 
Council’s accomplishments and contributions had far exceeded what anyone present 
at its beginnings in 1996 could have expected from a body void of many features of a 
traditional international organization:  it was founded on the basis of a very general 
political declaration and without the support of a permanent secretariat or a stable 
budget (Kankaanpää & Young, 2012; Smieszek, 2019). Established as “a high-level 
forum”, throughout its existence, the council has managed to find for itself a niche 
among other international institutions and has gradually become the primary body 
for discussing matters pertaining to the Arctic. Thanks to its ingenious participatory 
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arrangement, where organizations of indigenous peoples sit as PPs alongside Arctic 
state officials, it has become an important mechanism for increasing the prominence 
of the concerns of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples (Koivurova & Heinämäki, 
2006; Sellheim, 2019). A relatively clear spatial definition of the problems within 
the council and its acting within a predefined group of states have contributed to 
building an “Arctic identity” and have paved the way for recognition of the Arctic as 
a distinct region in the international political consciousness (Graczyk & Koivurova, 
2015; Keskitalo, 2007; Keskitalo, 2004). Moreover, the AC’s work has resulted in 
“probably the most significant accomplishment in Arctic environmental cooperation: 
a substantial expansion of our knowledge about the Arctic environment, including 
natural and anthropogenic processes” (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 312). It has 
also enabled the identification of major risks to the inhabitants of the region and 
the forms of responses for addressing those risks. The council has provided critical 
input into negotiations and the implementation of international conventions, such 
as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001) and the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury (2013; Downie & Fenge, 2003), and, in recent 
years, has itself offered a negotiating space for several legally binding circumpolar 
agreements. It has catalyzed the formation of new regional entities such as the AEC, 
the Arctic Offshore Regulators Forum, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Finally, 
in providing for regular meetings of Arctic scientists, civil servants, and high-level 
officials, the AC has favoured building continuity of circumpolar cooperation, 
fostered good relations, and ensured mutual confidence-building among Arctic 
states, ultimately promoting peace in the region, which previously had served as one 
of the main theatres of the Cold War (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015; Article 2). 
Nonetheless, despite these contributions, the council’s power to influence and 
“make a difference” in Arctic relations has been frequently disparaged and, as 
illustrated in the Article 3 of this thesis, virtually from the outset, the AC has been 
subject to reform proposals, both from within and from outside its circles, aimed 
at improving is performance, enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. Among the 
major points of criticism has been the soft-law nature of the AC as of a high-level 
intergovernmental forum, rather than a traditional international organization, and 
the resultant non-legally binding status of its outputs and recommendations. In words 
of Durfee and Johnstone (2019: 77), “[t]he Arctic Council is disproportionately 
influential for what is structurally no more than a roundtable for discussion with no 
lawmaking powers or compliance mechanisms”.  
It is this disproportionate influence that triggered this inquiry and an in-depth 
case study of the Arctic Council in the first place. With the progress of my research, 
it became apparent, however, that the council’s performance is not its only aspect 
worthy of closer examination – the AC also exhibits other characteristics which set 
it apart from the previously considered universe of cases of international regimes. As 
previously asserted, much like the Arctic region itself, over the last 25 years, the Arctic 
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Council has served as an example of innovation in modes of governance (Arctic 
Governance Project, 2010) – an example that I found underresearched and of much 
relevance not only to the region, but also with possible lessons for other governance 
issue or spatial areas. The experience of unparalleled Arctic transformation and 
the prevailing uncertainty about the trajectory of future developments present us 
simultaneously with a challenge and an opportunity to focus our efforts on new ways 
of thinking about the governance mechanisms at our disposal, as well as the means of 
enhancing them (Nilsson & Koivurova, 2016; Young, 2012b). While inquiry along 
these lines might call into question some of the prevailing assumptions about the 
nature of international system and its main actors, it is equally important that such 
research both draws from and contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the 
institutional dimensions of global environmental change and global environmental 
governance. Accordingly, it was the quest to understand the Arctic Council through 
the lens of regime theory that resulted in the findings presented in brief in the next 
section and elaborated in detail in Articles 2–4 in this dissertation. These findings 
serve, in turn, as a basis for putting forward the concept of informal international 
regimes outlined towards the end of this synthesis.  
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5. OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLES
5.1. Article 1: Role of the Arctic Council Chairmanship
The first article concerns the role of the chairmanship in the AC. Chronologically 
written and published much earlier than the subsequent articles, the paper focuses 
on the structural aspect of the council that at the time of its writing had received little 
scholarly attention and remained largely understudied in writings on the AC and 
Arctic governance. With the exception of articles by Nord, who focused exclusively 
on the Swedish chairmanship of the AC (Nord, 2013), few other authors who dealt 
with the subject did so in separation from theoretical underpinnings related to the 
role of chairs in international negotiations and bargaining (Exner-Pirot, 2011; Fenge, 
2013; Spence, 2013, 2015), a gap that I found to be worth exploring. Accordingly, 
the article had a twofold purpose: first, to examine the institutional arrangements as 
well as specific provisions pertaining to the chairmanship and the chair of the AC, 
and second, to analyze these provisions and resulting practice in light of the general 
literature on the subject.
The scant attention offered to the question of chairmanship has by no means 
been limited to the context of the AC. The scholars who focused on the subject 
found their work situated largely within the rational approach to the design of 
international institutions, in line with which “states use international institutions 
to further their own goals” (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001: 762) and where 
design features of specific institutions are a “result of rational, purposive interactions 
among states and other international actors to solve specific problems” (ibid.). 
To this end, the position of chair is a functional response to problems relating 
to collective action and bargaining in a multilateral context: potential failures of 
agenda, negotiation, and representation. Through tasks typically conferred upon the 
chairmanship—namely agenda management, brokerage, and representation—states 
seek to address difficulties of overcrowded or shifting agendas and the inability of 
parties to identify underlying areas of agreement, as well as handle relations with 
non-members and represent the institution vis-à-vis third parties. Although the 
chair is usually expected to conduct assigned functions with a view to promoting 
collective gains, the office of the chair, once vested with the power of process control, 
thus offers a platform for influencing outcomes of the process (Tallberg, 2010: 245). 
As a result, despite the procedural character of most of the chair competences, the 
political importance of the chair should not be underestimated; the conduct of the 
chairmanship, particularly in a rotating system, presents states with a manoeuvring 
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space that they can use to their own advantage and in pursuit of their national 
interests. This space, however, does not come without constraints, and among the 
parameters affecting the chair’s performance are the international environment of an 
institution, the nature of the issue under consideration, institution-specific features, 
and, finally, the chair’s personal skills. 
It was against this background that, upon reviewing the origins and negotiations 
that led to the final agreement on the AC’s institutional set-up, I examined 
the specific tasks and responsibilities conferred upon the chair of the AC by the 
council’s rules of procedure, both in its original version as well as the one revised and 
adopted in 2013. In brief, I found that the most noticeable example of the AC chair’s 
discretion is the customary practice of presenting by the chairing country a program 
of objectives for its AC tenure—providing directions for the AC in two-year time 
spans and playing much of the agenda-setting role typically conferred to chairs in 
international organizations. In light of the culture of dialogue and the practice of 
round-table discussions within the AC and its subsidiary bodies, the brokerage 
function turned out to be of lesser importance, much like the representation 
function of the AC in other international fora, where the AC cannot represent its 
member states in international negotiations and any statements it delivers must be 
approved by consensus of all council members. 
As the article was written in 2015, one of the most pressing questions pertaining 
at that time to circumpolar collaboration in general, and to the AC in particular, 
concerned the impacts of external events—and more specifically of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014—on the council’s work and operation. Since 
the AC is a consensus-based body, the endorsement of its actions by all Arctic states 
is essential to its continued functioning. In light of the increasing uncertainty as well 
as the periodical conditions of animosity in international collaboration, I argued 
that identifying underlying areas of agreement and finding common ways to further 
cooperation might become issues of greater significance, thus potentially increasing 
the importance of the AC chair in brokerage among various Arctic actors. It was 
also in this context that I found worth noting and further exploring the role and 
potential of individuals—the SAO chairs—as the entrepreneurial leaders in the 
chairmanship process.
Viewed from the overall perspective of my inquiry/investigation, the findings 
from this first article laid the grounds for my future work on the structure, change 
agents, and evolution of the AC, a topic to which I returned in the fourth article 
included in this thesis.
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5.2. Article 2: Evaluating Institutional Effectiveness:  
The Case of the Arctic Council
While my research interest revolved around questions of the effectiveness of the AC, 
the article “Evaluating Institutional Effectiveness: The Case of the Arctic Council” 
stemmed from the disconnection I observed between the majority of the literature 
on the AC’s effectiveness and the general literature on the subject of effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes. Not only did I find this observation puzzling, 
but I also considered a lack of systematic and transparent inquiry into the effectiveness 
of the council a factor inhibiting our accumulation of knowledge about what ‘makes 
the AC work’. Moreover, I argued that the prevailing disengagement of most of the 
AC accounts from the general literature on international regimes prevents us, on 
the one hand, from drawing from the insights of this literature, while, on the other 
hand, inhibiting an opportunity to contribute with the case study of the AC to the 
broader body of knowledge about international environmental institutions.
To address this matter, I devised a basic framework through which future studies 
of the AC could be better grounded in the general literature on international 
environmental regimes and their effectiveness, benefitting both our comprehension 
of the AC and the broader field of regime inquiry. Treating the AC as an institution 
or regime as these terms are used in the broader literature on international relations 
allowed me to tap into that field and make use of the scholarship on regime 
effectiveness to structure our thinking about the council. Cognizant of a variety 
of existing definitions of institutional effectiveness, I explicitly chose the political 
conceptualization of the term that is concerned with the extent to which an 
institution or regime contributes to solving or mitigating the problems that led to its 
creation. What characterizes this approach is its focus on observable changes in the 
behaviour of actors that can be convincingly attributed to the operation of a regime 
and that are responsible for the improved environment.
Based on the findings and the broader discussion of effectiveness in the 
international environmental regime literature, I put forward a framework of five 
elements of importance for the council’s analysis. They included: definitions and 
natures of problems addressed by the council, operationalization of a yardstick 
to gauge the effectiveness of the AC, a question of institutional interplay, causal 
mechanisms behind the council’s influence, and finally, consideration of the council’s 
soft-law basis. While four of the factors explicitly referred to those identified in the 
general literature on international regimes, the last one specifically addressed an 
aspect that has often been raised in discussions about the council’s (in)effectiveness: 
the AC’s lack of strong legal foundation. It was through the adoption of these factors 
from the general literature that the article devised a framework and laid the ground 
for a better foundation for future studies of the AC’s effectiveness within a broader 
field of scholarly inquiry on international regimes.
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Even though the article did not aim at an actual evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the council and did not carry out such an assessment, the preliminary analysis 
revealed, among other findings, the AC’s potential for increased normative impact 
over Arctic states and other actors with interests in the region that could stem from 
the AC’s newly developed non-binding framework on black carbon and methane, 
rather than, as often repeated by observers of Arctic affairs, from the recent legally 
binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the council. Interestingly—
and importantly for my own further inquiry—the point questioned the prevalence 
of a line of reasoning that perceives regulations and legally binding norms stemming 
from the AC as the ultimate and most functional solutions to Arctic challenges. 
Moreover, it raised an important question about the AC’s own evolution and 
direction of change in light of the rapidly and profoundly changing character of the 
socio-ecological setting in which it operates, as well as underlined the importance 
of renewed interest in the effectiveness of soft-law instruments in the international 
context. In general, these observations not only signalled areas that merit closer 
attention in our future research on the council, but also demonstrated the value of 
systematic application of insights from the general literature to our thinking about 
the AC. 
While the application of the central ideas of the broader literature on institutional 
effectiveness served primarily to structure and illuminate our understanding of 
issues that should be addressed when examining the effectiveness of the AC, it 
simultaneously raised several questions not yet fully answered in the international 
relations literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes that 
are worthy, in my assessment, of closer examination. These questions concerned the 
interplay between binding and nonbinding norms and instruments in regional and 
global governance, a deepened understanding of the cognitive causal mechanism, 
and the relationship between institutional dynamics and effectiveness. In addressing 
them, I argued that a continued, deepened inquiry of the AC regime may prove 
helpful not only to enhancing our comprehension of the AC but may also be of 
significant value to our broader knowledge of international relations.
5.3. Article 3: Do the Cures Match the Problem?  
Reforming the Arctic Council
Building from the second article and one of questions that arose from it—concerning 
the direction of the AC’s change and evolution—the aim of the third paper was 
the evaluation of the reform proposals that have been presented to the AC thus 
far. Despite the council’s numerous valuable contributions to Arctic governance, 
throughout its history the AC has been subject to criticism and reform proposals 
floated by academic, non-governmental, and practitioner communities alike. While 
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the question of reforming the council to increase its effectiveness and improve 
its fit with the biophysical and social setting in which it operates has always been 
relevant, I consider it even more so today, in light of the forces and processes that 
are fundamentally transforming the Arctic region. Not only climate change and 
globalization but also the proliferation of mechanisms and institutions relevant to 
Arctic governance call, in my view, for continuous evaluation and consideration of 
the form and role of the council in this constantly changing landscape. Therefore, 
in order to inform the ongoing debate about the AC’s reform, I took stock of the 
proposals presented to the council and for the analytic purposes grouped them 
into three clusters: legal reforms, organizational reforms, and functional reforms. 
Next, I examined each cluster of reform proposals in terms of their applicability and 
usefulness to the AC, with a special emphasis on their suitability given the prevailing 
conditions in the Arctic and their potential to enhance the effectiveness of the AC. 
As before, I understood this effectiveness as the extent to which the council, as an 
institution, is able to solve or alleviate the problems that led to its creation.
From the analysis conducted in the article, a few conclusions emerged. First, the 
council is not well-suited to serve a legally binding regulatory function, and instead 
of spending energy on legal hardening of states’ commitments, it would benefit 
more from enhancing reporting and review procedures of existing soft norms and 
guidelines. Second, changes to streamline the council’s work and structure, set forth 
largely in line with the logic of national administrations and bureaucracies, should 
be viewed more as measures aimed to increase the AC’s efficiency, not necessarily 
its effectiveness. Whereas enhancing efficiency is of unquestionable importance to 
a forum with a constantly tenuous financial basis, I argue that the two concepts—
efficiency and effectiveness—should not be conflated and confused. Finally, in terms 
of functional reform proposals contextualized to Arctic political, environmental, 
and legal realities, while they have ranked the highest in terms of their potential 
to tailor the council’s role to the setting in which it operates and to the fluid nature 
of circumstances in the region and beyond, in my assessment they seemed to have 
occasionally fallen short due to their insufficient level of detail—a deficiency that, if 
addressed, could conceivably enhance them even further.
What the completed analysis revealed most of all was that certain ideas for 
strengthening the council, like providing it with a treaty foundation or streamlining 
its workflows, have been systematically promoted from the AC’s establishment, 
irrespective of changes in the international and Arctic natural environments. 
Whereas the paper’s discussion of the three categories of reform served to elucidate 
their applicability to the case of the AC and their adequacy from the perspective 
of the challenges facing the Arctic, not as a broader critique of the major schools 
of thought behind them, it indicated that the ideas put forward by various authors 
often stem predominantly from their general thinking about what constitutes 
an effective means of international collaboration and addressing environmental 
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problems, rather than from a consideration of the specific conditions of the Arctic 
and the AC. I found this to be an important inference, given the fundamental 
changes occurring in both Arctic and global socio-environmental settings that call 
into question the usefulness of past modes of thinking and forms of international 
cooperation. I concluded that the need to be aware of that tendency, and to pay 
careful attention to how well prescribed measures match the nature of the issues to 
be addressed, is the primary lesson one should take from this examination of past 
proposals for the reform of the AC. 
5.4. Article 4: Steady as She Goes? Structure, Change Agents  
and the Evolution of the Arctic Council
In the final article, I turned my attention to the institutional change that the 
AC has experienced since its formation in 1996. As before, I sought to inform 
our understanding of the AC with the findings from the general literature on 
international environmental regimes, also complemented in this case with insights 
flowing from broader studies of gradual institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010). 
The fact that the AC since its establishment has evolved significantly in reach 
and stature has not escaped the attention of scholars and practitioners. Most 
of the accounts dedicated to the council’s evolution have focused, however, on 
developments that have taken place in the council between 2007 and 2009, and on 
the exogenous sources of the AC’s change. In order to complement that outlook 
and deepen our comprehension of the AC, I sought in the article to answer two 
primary questions: first, what are the changes that have taken place in the AC since 
its inception? Second, how can we explain those changes? It is important to note 
that in the latter inquiry, I concentrated specifically on the council’s endogenous 
properties that enable or constrain its change and that thus far, in my assessment, have 
received little treatment in studies of the AC. Cognizant of the fact that complex 
causality is the salient feature in virtually every case of institutional change, and that 
institutional change always arises from combinations of various interactive drivers, 
the aim of this article did not go as far as to offer a provision of a full explication of 
the AC’s change. Instead, I considered the presented research an important step in 
a process aimed at understanding the council’s evolution, filling a significant gap 
in the existing scholarship on the council and paving the way for future studies to 
investigate the abovementioned interactions of both endogenous and exogenous 
drivers.
With respect to changes that have taken place in the council, there has been a 
multitude of them. Among others, the study showed that, contrary to commonly 
held perceptions, it took nearly a decade to operationalize the provisions of the 
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Ottawa Declaration and that the structure of the council as presently known—with 
six permanent participants and six working groups—was not fully established until 
2006. Moreover, the council’s administrative capacities have been much enhanced 
thanks to the establishment in 2013 of the Arctic Council Secretariat, which 
today also serves as the secretariat of the ACAP and EPPR working groups and 
is located in Tromsø, Norway, along with most of the secretariats of the working 
groups and the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat, which are no longer dispersed 
among Arctic states and are instead centralised in a single location. With respect 
to its subsidiary bodies, the AC currently maintains—in addition to its six regular 
working groups—from two to five task forces and expert groups at any moment, 
one of the most significant of the structural changes to the council. Finally, it has 39 
observers, in contrast to the original nine in 1998, and a unifying set of strategies 
and guiding documents that clarify the responsibilities of various actors within the 
AC and steer their relations with the outside world. In addition to changes in the 
council’s structure, I also found numerous less formal, yet no less consequential, 
changes in terms of social practices within the AC. These include, among others, a 
shift towards issues related to economic development, the introduction of executive 
meetings of SAOs, attendance of the council’s meetings by higher-ranked officials 
and diplomats, and the elimination of direct recommendations from the SAO 
reports to ministers, which arguably leaves more space for direct negotiations of AC 
ministerial declarations by foreign ministry representatives. More specific policy 
recommendations have also begun to be included in the council’s various assessment 
reports, and there have also been more extensive follow-up activities carried out 
with respect to some of these recommendations, even if the overall record of the 
implementation of AC guidelines has not been especially favourable. Finally, the 
AC has expanded the capacity-enhancement side of its work, most notably in areas 
covered by ACAP as well as by the first two legally-binding treaties negotiated 
under the auspices of the council—search and rescue and oil-spill preparedness. In 
sum, all of these developments taken jointly represent an AC that is viewed today 
as the centrepiece of Arctic governance, whose portfolio has significantly expanded, 
whose structure has grown, and whose procedures have been decisively streamlined, 
providing much stronger top-down steering from the SAOs and thus, respectively, 
Arctic states’ ministries of foreign affairs. It is a much more coherent and high-profile 
body than before, with a much higher level of interest and dedication paid to it by its 
members and observers alike.
When it comes to the second question on explaining these changes, the analysis 
presented in the article revealed that the AC’s constitutive features—a lack of legal 
foundation, decision-making based on consensus, an open to multiple interpretations’ 
mandate as well as a strictly defined and limited membership—create a very malleable 
setting susceptible to the influence, both positive and negative, of agents seeking 
to instigate gradual change and ultimately steer the trajectory of developments 
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within the council. As such, the analysis drew our attention to previously 
understudied questions of agency and endogenous sources in the processes of 
institutional change of the AC.
Finally, and importantly from the perspective of my overall in-depth case study 
of the AC, the examination presented in the article and an effort to analyze and 
classify changes observed in the AC revealed that the application of distinctions 
from the general literature on international environmental regimes to the council 
is far from straightforward, and that the council oftentimes does not precisely fit 
the proposed categories. Whereas this observation is not in itself particularly 
revelatory, seeing that the terminology we find in the literature has been designed 
primarily with cases of hard law and treaty-based institutions in mind, it showed the 
potential that a study of the council—a soft-law arrangement based on a political 
declaration—might offer in terms of expanding our understanding of international 
environmental institutions and changes within them. As a result, the conclusions 
from the article served as an important building block in my further elaboration of 
the concept of informal international regimes—the culmination of my inquiry into 
the AC presented in this thesis.
Before moving there, the following chapter provides an overview of discussions 
related to soft law and its role in international cooperation. 
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6. SOFT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION
“The only thing that is constant is change.”
Heraclitus
The increasing use and rise in prominence of international soft law is reflective of many 
developments that have taken place in the international arena in the last 70 years. This 
chapter provides a brief overview of major issues related to the concept of soft law, 
starting from its emergence and contested nature, through the benefits it offers, to 
the arguments presented by its critics. As such discussions are ongoing and far from 
decisive, the aim of this chapter is not to cover them at length and in detail. Rather, 
they serve as a point of departure to explain the preferred use of the term informal – 
rather than soft law regimes – even if both terms refer, in principle, to the same form 
of arrangements. The last section of this chapter presents the rationale for this choice, 
before the concept of international informal regimes is elaborated in the next chapter. 
6.1. The Emergence of Soft Law
Change is a pervasive feature of all social institutions. It has become a commonplace 
to note that, since World War II, the entire international system has undergone 
profound transformation. From a relatively small community of predominantly 
Western states, the global arena has evolved to today comprise more than four times 
the number of states that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. From only 70 
internationally recognized states in 1949, it now consists of more than 200 states, 192 
of them with UN membership (Compagnon, Chan, & Mert, 2012). Concurrently, 
we have observed the emergence of new non-state actors taking the stage and playing 
increasingly important international roles: intergovernmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, international 
bureaucracies, professional associations, and others. Their emergence is reflection of 
other broader developments, among others, increasing economic interdependence 
among countries, a rise of a global environmental agenda, and a growing awareness 
of the multiplicity of problems that require international solutions. All these have 
been further intensified by the phenomenon of globalization which represents a 
fundamental transformation of the international system “with lasting implications 
for the public and private sectors alike, including changes in the nature of the legal 
processes and structures that shape the relationships and interactions among states” 
(Reinicke & Witte, 2000: 75). 
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An ever-growing number of transnational problems and an increasing diversity 
of international actors have outpaced traditional methods of law-making. New 
circumstances require diversified forms and levels of rule-making and have accordingly 
been addressed by international organizations, specialized agencies, programmes, 
and even private bodies, which have engaged in articulating and issuing regulations, 
declarations, guidelines, and codes of conduct for state and non-state actors alike, 
giving consequently rise to what has become known as “soft law” (Chinkin, 2000). 
As a result of these developments, the relative simplicity of traditional international 
law has given way to more complex forms, processes, instruments, and norms that 
began to act “as a bridge between the formalities of law-making and the needs of 
international life” (Chinkin, 2000: 42).
The discussion on questions pertaining to soft law has largely taken place within 
the legal scholarly community, where, up to the present, the concept has remained 
subject to debate, including voices that argue for its redundancy and outrightly 
reject the notion of making law through non-binding instruments. In words of one 
of those critics, “within the binary mode, law can be more or less specific, more or 
less exact, … more or less serious, more or less far-reaching; the only thing it cannot 
be is more or less binding.” (Klabbers, in Chinkin, 2000: 24). This opposition, 
nonetheless, has not prevented the acknowledgement of a prominent role for soft 
law in the ordering of international affairs and in the international normative system. 
Important scholarship on matters of compliance with non-binding norms followed 
(D. L. Shelton, 2000). 
6.2. Varieties of Soft Law
With respect to the forms and categorization of soft law, it has been recognized that 
soft law appears in virtually an “infinite variety” of forms (Baxter, in Chinkin, 2000: 
25). Accordingly, there are various ways of categorizing international instruments 
within the term. Among others, instruments are regarded as soft law when they are 
articulated in non-binding form according to traditional modes of law-making; 
contain vague and imprecise terms; originate in bodies lacking international law-
making authority; or are directed at non-state actors (Chinkin, 2000). Soft law can 
be also classified according to its relationship with hard law. As such, soft law can, for 
instance, serve as evidence for the existence of hard law obligations. Elaborative soft 
law provides guidance to the interpretation, elaboration, and application of hard law. 
Soft law can also be viewed as emergent hard law in situations in which it represents 
a first step in the process of the subsequent hardening and evolution towards legally 
binding norms. Overall, this approach is, however, problematic in that, rather than 
defining soft law in its own terms, it considers it via the means of its distinction from 
hard law. Moreover, and importantly from the perspective of this thesis, scholars 
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admit that such treatment of soft law is reflective of the widespread conviction among 
lawyers and foreign policy officials who assume that the transformation into hard 
obligation is desirable and that “unless there are good reasons for using an informal 
instrument, a treaty is usually to be preferred” (Aust, 1986: 792). Accordingly, in 
their view, soft law is typically considered an “underdeveloped” form, merely a stop, 
or a developmental stage on the way towards legally binding commitments.10 Rather 
than conceiving of soft law as creating “a crucial framework for conversation, in 
which states in turn may alter their conception of their interests and even identity” 
(Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002: 552), “the professional instinct of lawyers [is] … to 
negotiate seemingly ‘binding’ agreements as soon as possible” (Toope, 2000: 98). 
The discussion on this matter looks quite different in international relations 
community. First, the matter of the legal basis and a subsequent distinction between 
legally binding and non-binding rules has never been considered key among IR 
scholars for the ordering of international affairs. Part of reason for this situation 
arguably has to do with the beginnings of the debate on international institutions, in 
which proponents of the realist approach generally held institutions to be void of any 
influence or causal significance vis-à-vis states, irrespective of those institutions’ legal 
foundations. As illustrated in the second chapter of this thesis, international regime 
scholars took an opposite stance and, through their work, significantly advanced our 
understanding of the important roles and contributions of international institutions 
to international society. What both groups agree on is that the notion of “binding-
ness” in the context of public international law is elusive at best, and faulty at worst. 
Where most international legal community has advocated the position that legally-
binding instruments represent law and as such carry particular obligations and 
imply special norms of conduct, the IR community has pointed out that any simple 
analogy of international treaties or conventions with domestic contracts is mistaken 
due to the ultimate lack of equivalent enforcement mechanisms in the anarchic 
community of sovereign states (Young, 1999). “For that reason, it is misleading to 
understand treaties (as international lawyers typically do) in purely formal, legal 
terms, as instruments that somehow bind states to their promises” (Lipson, 1991: 
305) as there is not much that the language of formal obligation in the treaties can 
do in practice to make countries fulfil their commitments if they no longer see them 
as serving their interests.11 What sustains treaties in practice is that, at any given 
moment, each party believes it gains more from sustaining the agreement than from 
violating or terminating it (Lipson, 1991). 
10  At the same time, it is worth pointing out that there are legal scholars who disagree with such view 
and claim that “[e]ven if soft law does not harden up, (…) [it] performs important functions, and, given 
the structure of the international system, we could barely operate without it” (Reisman, 1988: 376).
11  The commonplace conception of lawmaking in domestic political systems, the enactment of legislation 
by highly specialized and routinized political institutions, is utterly inappropriate for an inquiry about 
lawmaking in a much more complex and varied international political system (Reisman, 1988: 373). 
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This does not mean that political scientists do not differentiate between various 
instruments or do not assign any particular value to international treaties. On the 
contrary, they too recognize the greater weight attached to the treaty form by both 
state and non-state actors alike. In their eyes, however, this weight has more to with 
signaling the gravity of the underlying promises by enshrining them in a treaty form, 
which results in increasing the reputational costs for those who breach them. “Put 
simply, treaties are a conventional way of raising credibility of promises by staking 
national reputation on adherence” (Lipson, 1991: 310).
6.3. Pros and Cons of Soft law
Both IR analysts and foreign policy practitioners recognize that informal, soft law 
instruments offer many advantages and qualities highly valued and sought after in 
the international community. They argue that states choose to order their relations 
through treaties and other legally binding arrangements to solve specific problems, 
and they recur to softer forms when these offer superior institutional solutions 
(Abbott & Snidal, 2000). According to Lipson (1991), states choose informal 
agreements when they want to avoid formal and visible pledges; when they wish to 
avoid ratification; when they seek to preserve their ability to renegotiate or modify 
an agreement as circumstances change or it fails to meet its goals; or when they need 
to reach agreements quickly. In addition to speed, simplicity, flexibility, and privacy 
– “all common diplomatic requirements” (Lipson, 1991) – soft law may be preferred 
to hard law for other reasons too, including significant changes in the overarching 
setting of international cooperation. Among others, the growth of international 
institutions and the accompanying increasing bureaucratization of relations among 
countries can be such factors. As, in general, international institutions lack powers 
to adopt legally binding instruments, they only have recourse to soft law. In turn, 
they provide incentives for states to comply with adopted norms by assisting them 
with their implementation, monitoring, and their evaluating of their performance 
(D. L. Shelton, 2000).  
States might choose soft law out of respect for hard law, in cases in which they feel 
they cannot necessarily meet the requirements of a norm.12 Soft-law instruments 
may serve as devices to persuade states to join the cooperative arrangements; 
they can be also regarded as a sign of the “growing strength and maturity of the 
international system” (ibid.), in which the on-going collaboration and stability 
of existing structures create a setting in which there is no need to govern all of its 
12  Once more the perspectives on that matter differ between international law and international relations 
community. In the counterargument to the above presented claim, IR scholars note that states “may [also] 
sign treaties cynically, knowing that they can violate them cheaply” (Lipson, 1991: 308). 
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elements by means of legally-binding norms. Moreover, in particular circumstances, 
legally binding norms may be even an inappropriate form of response, such as when 
the issue or the effective means of addressing it are not yet clearly identified or when 
an agreement reached in terms of hard law would effectively result in the adoption 
of watered down and less progressive norms. Finally, soft law offers the distinct 
advantage of allowing for more active participation by non-state actors who are 
increasingly vital not only to the development of international norms, but also to 
their implementation and the achievement of their prescribed goals (D. L. Shelton, 
2000).
None of the above means that informal arrangements come without a cost. On 
the contrary, because informal agreements do not in general require a domestic 
ratification process, they may suffer from a lack of formal and visible national 
commitment – both in eyes of participants in the negotiations as well as in those 
of the third parties. Informal agreements are also frequently viewed as less effective 
in binding national policy across sectors and various branches of government and 
administration, and they typically generate lower levels of interest and support 
from public and private actors alike. As a result, they can be more difficult to 
sustain during the implementation stage and are more easily abandoned (Lipson, 
1991).
The adoption of treaties and other legally binding measures also, however, 
comes at a price. Both legal and international relations scholars concede that 
treaty-making is usually a slow, costly process, typically neither sufficiently flexible 
nor effective in accommodating public policy demands. Moreover, because the 
provisions of treaties stem from carefully negotiated consensus, often they more 
reflect the lowest common denominator among parties, rather than the scale of 
response required to appropriately address the international challenges that are 
being faced. Furthermore, treaties typically classify states rigidly as either parties 
or non-parties to the treaty, which “does not favor regime development, let alone 
success, because it excludes a priori those that are financially or technically unable 
to comply and those who disagree with the obligations” (Reinicke & Witte, 2000: 
88). Finally, the prospects and possibilities of compliance with treaties might be 
increasingly hampered under conditions of globalization, where many states might 
be effectively unable to comply with the adopted norms, in particular when the 
objects of regulation are highly mobile and have effects transnationally, as is the 
case with financial markets and environmental pollution (Reinicke & Witte, 
2000). As noted by Chayes and Chayes (1995: 14), “[t]he problem is even more 
acute in contemporary regulatory treaties. Such treaties are formally among states, 
and the obligations are cast as state obligations (…). [T]he real object of the treaty, 
however, is not to affect state behavior but to regulate the activities of individuals 
and private entities”.
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6.4. Making States Behave
The question of “making states behave” underpins many discussions pertaining to 
soft law and has been central to debates on compliance with non-legally binding 
normative techniques. There are nevertheless also those for whom considerations 
of soft law in terms of compliance are “particularly awkward and incoherent” 
(Bilder, 2000: 72) and, rather than helping us understand the mechanisms of 
international collaboration, they risk obscuring the role that non-binding norms 
play within it. In the view of these experts, compliance analysis is more suited to a 
discussion of imposed norms, rather than those that have been reached consensually 
among sovereign states negotiating in the international setting (Bilder, 2000: 66). 
According to Bilder (2000: 68), foreign policy officials generally see “international 
norms not simply as instruments for creating commitments and obligations, but 
rather as multi-purpose policy tools that may be used to accomplish broader 
objectives”, including communicating foreign policy objectives, encouraging 
further collaboration, laying the ground for future bargaining, and developing 
more elaborate norms. Likewise, what cannot be excluded is that, in consenting 
to a given norm, states might seek to achieve primarily internal or propaganda 
objectives, without actual intent to follow and implement the norm in practice 
(Lipson, 1991). For these reasons, rather than focusing on instances of compliance 
with or breach of individual norms, officials typically see such norms as only “one 
stone in the arch” (Bilder, 2000: 67) among the complex components defining the 
overall pattern of foreign affairs interest, a pattern that is constantly changing as 
dynamic external and internal factors play upon it. Moreover, rather than preserving 
the integrity of the norm itself, most often officials are primarily concerned with 
preserving the integrity of the state’s foreign position as a whole, both domestically 
and externally, with respect to other states and the other international partners 
involved (ibid.). Accordingly, rather than paying attention to the considerations 
that produced consent to a given norm in the past, officials tend to focus on the 
present and future contexts in which the norm needs to be implemented.13 For 
these reasons, some scholars argue that an emphasis on compliance with respect to 
non-legally binding norms and instruments is inappropriate, unhelpful, and “may 
point towards a backward-looking and essentially legalistic approach focusing on 
state ‘misbehaviour’, rather than towards a productive enquiry into devising and 
deploying better normative techniques and arrangements that facilitate more 
effective international dealings and cooperation” (Bilder, 2000: 72). They suggest 
that the use of the term soft law to describe norms and instruments that are not in 
13  In words of Bilder, “concept of what the norm was really intended to do, of why each party participated 
in its formation, and what EACH then understood it as requiring may have an important bearing on how 
seriously officials feel they should take the obligations it appears to contain” (Bilder, 2000: 68). 
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a legal form and not intended to be legally binding is misleading as such norms are 
not “in any of the usual senses in which we use the word, law at all” (ibid.). 
6.5. From Soft Law to Informal Regimes
In both legal and international relations scholarship terms, “soft law” and “informal” 
are typically used interchangeably and, as the section 6.2. showed, refer to a very wide 
spectrum of arrangements which, for a variety of reasons, are not considered legally 
binding. These reasons stem from, among others, the status of actors concluding 
them (state vs. non-state), the form in which the agreement is enshrined (treaty vs. 
declaration, memorandum of understanding, joint communiqué, etc.) as well as 
from several other criteria that have been subjected to long debates among scholars 
of international law and international relations.14 Detailing those discussions is, 
however, beyond the scope and aim of this contribution. What matters more for the 
subsequent elaboration of the concept of informal regimes is the explanation why, 
with respect to this particular subset of international arrangements, I propose to use 
the term informal, rather than soft law, regimes. 
As the previous sections have shown, debates pertaining to the notion of soft 
law remain heated and far from having reached decisive conclusions. This also 
applies to the voices of those who question even the appropriateness of using 
the term law in the case of norms and instruments not intended to be legally 
binding. These voices, however, seem to be in minority. What the overview of 
the literature reveals are two major threads that cut across the discussions and 
arguments outlined. First, the bulk of the literature on the topic of soft law focuses 
explicitly on the notion of and questions related to compliance, such as “do states 
comply with soft law; what factors compel states to comply; do these factors 
differ depending on whether law is hard or soft; [and] do states respond to soft 
law in ways that look like responses to hard law?” (D. L. Shelton, 2000: 3). Such 
emphasis has considerable merit and the question of keeping to the commitments 
undertaken in the anarchic international space is indisputably an important one. 
Moreover, it makes even more sense if we centre our attention explicitly on law, 
irrespective of whether we speak of its hard or soft materializations. Ultimately, 
law and compliance are conceptually linked not only because “law explicitly aims 
to produce compliance with its rules” (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002: 538), but also 
because “consistent non-compliance with a law not only impugns the particular 
14  For instance, according to Abbott and Snidal, “[t]he realm of “soft law” begins once legal arrangements 
are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation (…) [and] [t]
his softening can occur in varying degrees along each dimension and in different combinations across 
dimensions” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000b: 422).
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norm, but undermines the rule of law generally” (D. L. Shelton, 2000: 9), making 
it a matter of yet greater overarching concern. 
Second, possibly in connection with the focus on matters of compliance, in most 
discussions pertaining to soft law there is a marked propensity, as mentioned earlier, 
to consider it as an “underdeveloped” form, and a mere first step in the evolution 
towards legally binding commitments. While there have been exceptions to this 
line of reasoning, thinking of hard-law norms and instruments as superior to those 
rooted in soft law prevails and, I argue, influences our considerations of the desirable 
direction for improving the functioning and enhancing the effectiveness of existing 
informal institutions by implicitly suggesting and promoting their legal hardening. 
Consequently, by naming informal, rather than soft law, arrangements rooted in 
non-legally binding instruments, I seek to emphasize that those arrangements are 
not currently, as some would suggest, underdeveloped and, moreover, they are not 
likely to evolve into hard law arrangements any time soon.  
For this reason, and because of the predominant concern in the scholarship on 
soft law with the question of compliance, I propose to use the term informal, rather 
than soft law, to denote the subset of international regimes highlighted in this thesis. 
Whereas, strictly speaking, both terms – informal and soft-law regimes – would refer 
to arrangements concluded by means of non-legally binding instruments, I argue 
that, in practice, use of the term soft law inclines our thinking towards matters of 
states’ compliance with agreed norms, rather than towards the larger and more varied 
contributions and functions such regimes offer and serve. Moreover, as outlined in 
the second chapter of this thesis dedicated to the general literature on international 
regimes, there is a pronounced tendency to think of regimes primarily in regulatory 
terms, even if regimes can and frequently do also perform other important tasks, 
including procedural, programmatic, and generative ones (Young, 1999, 2011a). As 
much as the problem of compliance is prominent in the case of regulatory regimes, it 
is, however, much less pronounced when it comes to procedural, programmatic, and 
generative institutional arrangements (Young, 1999). As the arguments presented in 
the next chapter illustrate, there might be an increasing need to widen our spectrum 
of the promoted and desired functions of international collaborative efforts and 
move beyond the dominant focus on regulation. 
Thus, for the above-listed reasons, I propose to refer to the subset of international 
regimes created by states through non-legally binding means as informal regimes, 
rather than soft law regimes. In doing so, I purposefully seek to steer away from 
discussions that strongly tilt toward matters of compliance and the enforcement of 
international norms, that consider regimes primarily in regulatory terms, and that, 
in viewing the soft-law character of norms as a defect that needs to be remedied, lean 
toward enhancing them using legally binding means. 
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7. INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
“It is the theory which decides what can be observed.”
Albert Einstein in a conversation at a lecture of Werner Heisenberg, Berlin 1926
The in-depth case study of the AC presented in this thesis revealed several distinct 
features that set the AC apart from the previously examined universe of cases of 
international regimes. It is on the basis of these observations drawn from my 
examination of the AC that in this chapter I put forward a concept and a series of 
initial hypotheses about informal international regimes to be tested through future 
studies. As the final section of this chapter asserts, there are compelling arguments 
in favour of pursuing this line of inquiry and paying greater attention to scrutiny of 
informal international regimes. 
7.1.  Concept of Informal International Regimes
As mentioned previously, I propose to distinguish a subset of informal international 
regimes to denote arrangements that are concluded by states specifically by means of 
informal, non-legally binding agreements. Strictly speaking, informal regimes are 
a subset of international regimes, so “collections of rights, rules, principles, and 
decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the 
participants in these processes, and guide interactions among the participants” 
(Young, 2017b: 27) generated by states to address functionally defined issues or 
spatially designated areas.15 As this definition illustrates, the original formulation of 
a concept of regimes has never specified or constrained the basis of collaboration 
among states to solely formal, legally-binding instruments such as treaties or 
conventions. Neither has the concept precluded consideration of forms of 
cooperation among states that could derive from informal and non-legally binding 
agreements. This is, however, how the concept has been mostly applied in practice 
and in the empirical studies of the effectiveness of regimes that followed. As shown 
in the first part, there have been a multitude of inquiries dedicated to finding sources 
15  While I use in the text a shorter form of informal regimes for convenience, in each instance I refer 
to informal international regimes, so those arrangements that are concluded by states and not by private 
actors. Accordingly, the term here does not relate to transnational regimes, even if these regimes too by the 
nature of their originators (non-governmental actors) and the consequent non-legally binding character 
of their outputs, can be considered informal.
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of regimes’ effectiveness (Underdal, 2002b), causal mechanisms behind their 
influence (Young et al., 1999), functions that regimes perform (Haas et al., 1993; 
Young, 1999), and exploring the dynamics of the science-politics interaction within 
regimes (Andresen, Skodvin, Underdal, & Wettestad, 2000). A more careful analysis 
of the selected cases reveals that virtually all international regimes considered in the 
literature have their basis in a legally-binding treaty or convention. Many studies have 
dealt with the protection of ozone layer (Parson, 1993, 2003; Wettestad, 2002b); 
many focused on acid rain and the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP) convention (Levy, 1993; Munton, Soroos, Nikitina, & Levy, 1999; 
Wettestad, 2002a); numerous examined land-based and oil pollution from ships at 
sea (Carlin, 2002; Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell, McConnell, Roginko, & Barrett, 1999; 
Skjærseth, 2002b, 2002a); and multiple analyzed management and conservation 
of marine resources (Andresen, 2002b, 2002a; Haas, 1990; Miles, 2002; Peterson, 
1993; Stokke, 2012). In general, relatively few regimes have been explored, in 
comparison to the vast numbers that exist, even if we considered only those formed 
through the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) (Kanie, 2018). 
As observed by Andresen, “[m]uch is known about some favoured regimes, but little 
or nothing about many others” (Andresen, 2013: 312) and in many instances criteria 
that were decisive for case selection could reduce possibilities for making claims 
generally applicable to the wider universe of international environmental regimes, 
let alone regimes dealing with other issue areas (Andresen & Wettestad, 2004). 
Importantly, it should be noted that this point, of limited universe of regime cases 
examined thus far, does not serve here as a critique of regime studies at large. On the 
contrary, the authors of the conduced studies were always clear and explicit about 
their adopted selection criteria, representativeness of chosen cases, and consequent 
possibilities and limitations of drawing generalizations from their inquiries. 
Instead, the point of distinguishing a subset of informal international regimes is to 
draw our attention to features of regimes based on non-legally binding agreements 
that vary them from international regimes built upon treaties; features worth 
highlighting not only in order to expand our body of knowledge and comprehension 
of international institutions, but also to provide us with a clearer understanding of 
a toolbox of mechanisms at our disposal to address arising more complex demands 
of international collaboration and governance. 
To reiterate, I propose to name this subset of regimes informal, instead of soft 
law, to steer away from a prevalent, in particular among legal scholars, line of 
thinking that tends to equate assessment of effects of soft law regimes with questions 
of compliance and enforcement, and which focuses predominantly on regulatory 
aspects and functions of international regimes. Moreover, in moving away from the 
term soft law, I emphasize the need to consider those arrangements in their own 
rights, rather than, as they are frequently viewed, an “underdeveloped” form of 
collaboration that might evolve into hard law and legally-binding commitments in 
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the future. In defining informal character of international agreements, rather than 
delving into detailed and often nuanced discussions concerning criteria that need 
to be met to consider specific norms legally binding (Chinkin, 2000), I adopt the 
approach proposed by Lipson who argued that “[a]greements may be considered 
informal, to a greater or lesser, if they lack the state’s fullest and most authoritative 
imprimatur, which is given most clearly in treaty ratification” (Lipson, 1991: 296). 
At the same time, whereas Lipson encompasses in his considerations the entire 
spectrum of informal agreements, from written through oral to tacit arrangements, 
I speak here specifically of those informal, non-legally binding agreements which 
states conclude in a written form.  
7.2. Distinctive Features of Informal International Regimes 
More important than the specification of the basis upon which informal regimes 
are founded is yet the identification of their distinctive features, or key differences 
between them and formal regimes as the two are considered distinct subsets of the 
overall universe of international regimes. Drawing from the study of the AC as 
a case of an informal regime, I propose below a several hypotheses about international 
informal regimes to be examined more systematically in future studies of the broader 
class of international regimes. To the extent possible, I seek to group them around 
the questions and categories that have structured the debate and scholarship on 
international formal regimes, including causes and processes of regime formation, 
implementation, effectiveness, and regimes’ change and dynamics.
First, informal international regimes can be adopted and put in place without any 
requirement for ratification on the part of their members. Consequently, they enter 
into life at the moment of their signing, without delays, sometimes significant, that 
occur in case of legally-binding agreements. Moreover, avoiding the requirement 
of ratification might be sometimes the only way to pursue and establish organized 
structures for international collaboration, especially in situations where the overtly 
polarized domestic political scene might effectively preclude reaching an agreement 
and sufficient support on any matters of substance. At the same time, as shown in 
the discussion about pros and cons of soft law, a lack of public debate surrounding 
ratification might conceal the depth of national support for informal agreement 
and, as a result, impede the process of their implementation by depriving them 
of visibility, sufficient consultation, and involvement of various policy sectors, 
stakeholders, branches of government and administration (Lipson, 1991). In words 
of Abbott and Snidal, “[h]ard legalizations reduces the post-agreement costs of 
managing and enforcing commitments, but adoption of a highly legalized agreement 
entails significant contracting costs (…), since the costs of violation are higher. Legal 
specialists must be consulted; bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy” (Abbott & 
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Snidal, 2000). As much as such approach prevails and might appear justified in cases 
of typical regulatory arrangements, it is less clear to what extent mobilization of state 
apparatus for the purposes of ratification and obtaining legislative authorization 
matters to putting in place and successful deployment of regimes performing other 
tasks.16
Second, informal regimes allow for much enhanced participation on the part 
of non-state actors. In case of the AC this is most clearly visible with the status 
of Permanent Participants, under which representatives of selected organizations 
of Arctic indigenous peoples have a strong voice in the council’s discussions and 
activities. Should the AC be a traditional treaty-based organization such 
arrangement would be highly unlikely, if not impossible. As asserted by Koivurova 
and Heinämäki, where “international law seriously restricts indigenous peoples’ 
opportunities to participate in the international law-making processes (…) of treaty, 
(…) soft law in fact provides indigenous peoples with a better opportunity for 
influential participation than is afforded to them by traditional methods” (Koivurova 
& Heinämäki, 2006: 101).17 In other words, because the informal agreements are 
not covered by provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
they allow for much greater flexibility and expansion of range of participants in the 
cooperation (Reinicke & Witte, 2000). 
The enhanced participation of non-state actors in informal regimes matters 
twofold. First, in the Arctic as elsewhere, whereas nation states remain critical players 
in responding to variety of arising governance needs, numerous other actors play 
increasingly important roles in devising and implementing these responses. These 
actors include subnational units of governments, indigenous peoples’ organizations, 
international and non-governmental organizations, and representations of business, 
to name a few (Arctic Governance Project, 2010). As the success and sustainability of 
governance efforts depend not only on recognizing the importance of those actors, 
but also on assigning them appropriate roles in the process, informal international 
regimes might offer one possible mechanism where, on the one hand, states retain 
their primary position, on the other hand, non-state actors can see their role much 
elevated compared to traditional treaty-based fora. This, in turn, could grant 
informal regimes with greater legitimacy understood as “the persuasive force of its 
norms, procedures, and role assignments (…), and manifested in a degree of positive 
16  For the implications of differentiation between regimes’ tasks for processes of regime formation and 
implementation see Young, 1999.
17  It should be noted here that the status of Permanent Participants provides indigenous peoples with 
much stronger position than that of a regular non-governmental organization. While this differentiation 
has important implications for broader discussion about rights and position of indigenous peoples in 
international negotiations, its detailed coverage lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. What matters 
from the perspective of this work is the fact that informal character of the AC allows for such ingenuine 
setup and enhanced involvement of non-state actors. 
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attitude to the regime” (Stokke & Vidas, 1996a: 23). As much as a relationship 
between legitimacy and the effectiveness of regimes is a complex one (ibid.), it 
is also recognized that treaty-based arrangements typically do not establish the 
degree of inclusiveness, support, and legitimacy to achieve acceptance and follow 
up by all, or even most of participants (Reinicke & Witte, 2000). While in “the 
twentieth century, legitimacy and accountability were mainly concerns of national 
governments and their decisions” (Biermann, 2014: 121), governance of complex 
systems in the era of Anthropocene might call for considering and establishing new 
forms of securing accountability and legitimacy, including through more deliberate 
use of informal international regimes. 
Third, informal regimes do not require explicit decision rules, at least not to the 
same extent as legally-binding agreements and treaties do. It is important to note 
here that this inference stems less from the case of the AC itself, and more from a 
general reflection on the nature of informal international arrangements. To explain, 
not only the Ottawa Declaration provides explicitly that decisions of the AC are 
to be taken by consensus of members of the council, but also the AC’s “relatively 
lengthy and detailed for an informal body which has no legal authority to bind its 
members” rules of procedure specify the operation of the council at all levels and 
how its activities are to be approved (Bloom, 1999: 718). In that sense it could be 
said that protracted negotiations, which led to the establishment of the AC were 
atypical for an informal regime, mostly because of an intransigent position taken by 
the United States that insisted on stripping a newly formed body of any resemblance 
to a traditional international organization, avoided accepting virtually any 
commitments towards a new institution, and “assured that there is no limitation 
on their ability to act in their national interest” (Bloom, 1999: 722). Accordingly, 
it could be well argued that a lengthy process behind the AC’s inception had its 
roots precisely in the willingness of some parties to pursue a more ambitious 
legally-binding arrangement, and a hardline resistance of one state to agree to it; 
where a wrangle about procedural issues was in fact “a surrogate for debate on more 
fundamental questions of purpose and direction” (Scrivener, 1999: 57; see also 
English, 2013). While it is beyond the point to speculate how the negotiations 
would have proceeded, should Arctic states from the onset had discussed an informal 
agreement and whether in that situation it would have had been possible to include 
more substantial provisions into text of the Ottawa Declaration, it is worth to keep 
this question in mind for future research and other case studies. 
Returning to the issue of decision rules, it can be stated that the AC’s single 
decision-making rule which does not require voting of the council’s members 
represents much simplified structure in comparison to formal agreements, 
which typically provide for comprehensive rules concerning regime’s day-to-day 
operations, matters of substance, and procedures required for amendment of 
a convention or its protocols. As the realization of the consensus rule in practice 
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of the AC shown, regime’s decision-making procedure can have important 
consequences for regime’s ability to adjust agilely to sometimes rapidly changing 
circumstances. Moreover, in combination with other factors, it can create an ample 
space and a malleable setting for the influence – both positive and negative – of 
change agents seeking to instigate a gradual change and ultimately influence the 
trajectory of regime’s development. 
Fourth, by their nature and because of the establishment through means different 
than multilateral international agreement, informal international regimes do not 
have legal personality that would be distinct from that of their individual members, 
the capacity to bear rights and owe duties on their own account. What follows, 
informal international regimes are not subjects of international law in the way that 
international organizations are, they also cannot speak on behalf of their members 
in relations with outside states or in international organizations. Importantly, lack 
of legal personality does not prevent informal international regimes from being 
endowed with formal organizational structures, like it happened in case of the AC 
and its standing Secretariat opened in Tromsø, Norway in 2013. In fact, the Host 
Country Agreement signed by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the director of the AC Secretariat (ACS) regulates the status of the ACS under 
Norwegian law “as akin to the status of other diplomatic missions under the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations” (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2015: 310). With 
more than ten members of staff18, the Secretariat gradually turns into a centerpiece 
of the entire AC structure. Arguably, this feature of informal international regimes: 
their capacity to acquire structures such as secretariats, without necessarily turning 
the bases of multilateral cooperation into legally-binding agreements might be among 
their most interesting and worth further exploration characteristics. Secretariats 
in international politics, “a hierarchically organized group(s) of international civil 
servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal 
rules of procedures within the context of a policy area” (Biermann, 2009: 37) are 
typically discounted as actors in their own right because of the mundane character 
of their basic administrative tasks such as organizing meetings, distributing 
documents, and maintaining websites; little, if any, decision-making authority, and 
their expected political neutrality. At the same time, most secretariats are the only 
permanent (in the physical sense) bodies of the institutions they support, contrasted 
with capital-based delegates from member states send to attend periodic meetings. 
Accordingly, there is much to be said about an important role and influence of 
secretariats in international environmental politics, in managing institutional 
interplay and in facilitating regime overlap in global environmental governance 
( Jinnah, 2014). While the focus of anyhow limited inquiry has been thus far on 
secretariats supporting international treaties, insights drawn from those studies 
18  For details on merger of the ACS and the Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat see Article 4.
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could inform also thinking about informal international regimes and a role of their 
secretariats. 
Fifth, informal international regimes have generally less access to material 
resources under their own control, the arrangement and constraint very well 
visible in the setup and functioning of the AC. Once more, it was the standing AC 
Secretariat that upon its establishment in 2013 became the first body within the AC 
to have a stable, specified budget ensured by all eight Arctic states (Arctic Council, 
2012). Other than that, the AC has no programming budget, the secretariats of 
all six working groups are funded voluntarily by AC members states, and all AC 
projects and activities are sponsored by one or more Arctic states on a voluntary 
basis – one of the main, steadily repeated points of criticism against the organization 
of the council, which in the past led not once to some projects being halted or 
delayed because of the lack of secured financial support (Haavisto, 2001; Rottem, 
2016; Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, The Russian Federation, 
2015). Concurrently, it is important to note that resources required to maintain 
administrative apparatus of informal international regimes as well as to fund their 
principal activities appear modest compared with formal international regimes and 
their respective intergovernmental organizations (Young, 2016b). 
Finally, compared to more formal international arrangements informal 
international regimes can be adjusted relatively easily, pointing to a much-desired 
characteristics of arrangements suitable to meet the demands of governance in 
the context of rapid, non-linear and compound changes. Even under regular 
circumstances, regimes can be occasionally challenged by changes in the nature 
of the problem they address, by parties to a regime, or by third parties, calling for 
response on a part of regimes’ administrators (Young, 2010). As shown in the 
Article 4, the case study of the AC is particularly instructive in terms of adjustments 
that an informal international regime can go through in order to reflect and adapt 
to changes in its broader biophysical and socioeconomic settings, without a need to 
introduce changes to its constitutive arrangements. As such, not only the informal 
status did not prevent the council from acquiring the organizational support in a 
form of the AC Secretariat, but it was also no obstacle to turning the council into a 
temporary venue for negotiations of legally-binding agreements concluded among 
eight Arctic states and signed in conjunction with the AC Ministerial meetings. 
Moreover, it has become a common practice within the council to establish time-
bounded task forces mandated to address specific issues of special interest to the 
AC and Arctic states. Finally, the AC has recently expanded a range of tools at its 
disposal by adopting in 2015 a novel Framework for Action on Enhanced Black 
Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions, which applies not only to Arctic 
states but also encourages greater involvement of non-Arctic states observers to the 
council. While it is too early to speak conclusively about the effectiveness of the 
framework in terms of its impact on emissions of short-lived climate pollutants, 
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its potential for filling important gaps in the overarching, global regulatory 
mechanisms is certainly worth noting – as is the council’s observed ability to adjust 
agilely to quickly changing conditions. 
The above presented list is neither exhaustive nor conclusive. As stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, those are several hypotheses which I have drawn from my 
observations and an in-depth inquiry of the AC. In order to validate them, more 
studies are needed, both from environmental as well as other issue areas. At the same 
time, a list of relevant and interesting questions pertaining to informal international 
regimes is much longer. Among others, it would be worth exploring empirically 
whether participants are willing to make deeper commitments when they are not 
legally binding. Moreover, are informal regimes well-suited to handle tasks that 
go beyond regulatory tasks? Do informal regimes connect with different units 
within member state governments than formal regimes? Does the absence of legally 
binding commitments lead to less effort on the part of member states? How should 
we systematically think about the performance of informal international regimes? 
What is a role of formal leadership in informal regimes? Do informal regimes 
receive less material support from member states than formal regimes? Are informal 
regimes able to adjust more quickly and effectively to changing circumstances than 
formal regimes? Overall, can we identify conditions under which informal regimes 
may produce better results as governance mechanisms than formal regime and 
vice versa? In other words, under what circumstances do informal regimes “fit” 
some situations better than formal regimes? In light of these questions, a series of 
hypotheses presented in this chapter could be, ideally, considered a mere beginning 
of a more systematic debate and examination of informal international regimes. The 
next section provides a rationale for such inquiry.
7.3. Broader Context and Relevance of Research  
on Informal International Regimes
As the previous section showed, informal international regimes have a number of 
features that may make them increasingly important in meeting needs for governance 
under conditions arising today and in the foreseeable future. This section presents 
several reasons why examination of informal international regimes in their own 
right, rather than as a suboptimal or developmental stage on a way to formal, legally-
binding arrangements, appears relevant and worth pursuing in today’s context of 
increasingly globalized and connected socio-ecological systems. 
First, as mentioned earlier, advancing globalization made the international 
law-making through traditional means of treaties and custom less appropriate and 
frequently insufficient to shape and steer relationships of the variety of actors central 
to today’s international society, many of them of non-state and sub-state character. 
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Despite improvements that have been made in hard-law making, treaty law still 
typically falls short of offering “process openness” and the degree of inclusiveness 
and legitimacy needed to achieve acceptance and compliance by all participants 
relevant to addressing issues on global agenda (Reinicke & Witte, 2000). 
Second, in many issue areas, despite undertaken commitments states as central 
actors are no longer able to effectively fulfil obligations of treaties they conclude, 
in instances when the real object of regulations are, indirectly, activities of private 
entities and individuals. Seeing that this lack of capacity is not limited to developing 
countries, but affects also industrialized economies, it renders valid consideration 
of forms of international cooperation that could be more conducive and open to 
integration of non-state actors and to enhancing legitimacy of transnational law- 
and policy-making processes. 
Third, given a structure of today’s global system, the sheer number of more than 
200 states creates a setting for international negotiations, in which reaching any 
legally-binding agreement, let alone a one that would be ambitious enough to meet 
the scale of observed global environmental problems, is increasingly challenging, 
arduous and time-consuming process, without mentioning time needed for 
ratification and entry into force of such agreement, as well as complexities of 
managing a regime having more than several dozen voting members. 
Fourth, while the global governance discourse appears to assume the universality 
of the Westphalian state, which is in fact Western and, more specifically, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) model of 
statehood, this assumption obscures the fact that contemporary statehood is more 
diverse than ever, with significant variations in power resources, degrees of statehood 
effectiveness and the exposure to the effects of globalization (Compagnon et al., 
2012). Consequently, where in theory all sovereign states enjoy equal rights and 
prerogatives in the international arena, developing and the least-developed countries 
tend to lack the capacity and influence that industrialized countries enjoy in the 
negotiation processes, making concluded agreements ultimately less fair, legitimate 
and less effective, thus providing additional rationale for seeking other, more 
adequate forms of organizing international cooperation. 
Fifth, growing diversity in the geopolitical and economic circumstances among 
states and the emergence of non-Western powers means that common interests 
can no longer be assumed and, whilst the current international legal system is built 
on the western model, “the priority accorded to law and legal sanction by western 
societies is not universal” (Chinkin, 2000: 25), and not unequivocally shared and 
supported by all states in the international arena. 
Sixth, in light of changes in the real world that are nonlinear, sometimes abrupt, 
and often irreversible, there is much to be said about the agility, a need to avoid 
locking in and being able to adjust respective institutions quickly enough. At the 
same time, the adaptability versus stability of governance systems is one of the core 
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dilemmas of global governance: the simultaneous need to create institutions that can 
adapt to rapid changes and the need for predictable, stable expectations for actors, 
“in short, the tension between adaptability, stability, and credibility of governance” 
(Biermann, 2014: 180). 
For all the above-mentioned reasons, I believe that informal international regimes 
– their formation, implementation, performance, and dynamics – merit more 
attention and dedicated research focus. While they are certainly not panacea to 
solve all complex policy challenges arising on the international agenda, they might 
represent, as the case of the Arctic Council shows, a novel, important, and so far 
largely unexamined governance tool at our hands.
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8.  CONCLUSIONS
“The Earth is Faster Now.”
Part of a book title “The Earth Is Faster Now: 
Indigenous Observations of Arctic Environmental Change” 
edited by Igor Krupnik and Dyanna Jolly
In many ways, the Arctic serves as a microcosm of developments unfolding in the 
global arena. During the past 30 years, the region has gone through a profound 
transformation driven by forces of climate change and globalization, and, with 
the observed and projected annual average warming more than twice the global 
mean, the Arctic remains at the forefront of global climate change. As if through 
a lens, we observe in the Arctic the characteristics of complex systems, where forces 
operating in one part of the Earth system can trigger unintended consequences in 
its other distant parts; where various components of Arctic socioecological system 
are linked in ways that effectively preclude dealing with them in separation from 
one another; and where the region is increasingly tightly connected with the rest 
of the world through both bio-geophysical and economic and geopolitical links. 
In the same vein, we observe today in the Arctic a mosaic of diverse state and 
non-state actors with stakes and interests in the region: great powers, small states, 
indigenous peoples, environmental groups, large multinational corporations, as well 
as a multitude of non-Arctic states, including emerging powers that seek to reassert 
their positions in an area of increasing global significance. In light of the above 
and the related paramount challenges faced by the region, it can be said that the 
Arctic has emerged as a governance barometer, an area indicative of the growing 
need for innovation in governance systems in the world ultimately altered through 
processes of climate change and globalization. At the same time, the Arctic has long 
been at the forefront of experimentation with new forms of innovative responses to 
complex and challenging problems of governance. In a wide network of cooperative 
arrangements and international mechanisms pertaining to the Arctic, the Arctic 
Council, the high-level forum established by eight Arctic states in 1996, has taken 
a prime position.
Over the course of its twenty-year lifetime, the council has provided numerous 
valuable contributions to Arctic governance: it has become an important mechanism 
for increasing recognition of the concerns of the Arctic’s indigenous peoples and 
the main generator of knowledge on changes within the circumpolar North. It also 
paved the way for recognition of the Arctic as a distinct region in the international 
political consciousness, provided critical input to international conventions, and 
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served to promote peace in the region, which previously served as one of the main 
theatres of the Cold War. Concurrently, throughout its history the AC has been 
subject to criticism and reform proposals from academic, non-governmental and 
practitioner communities alike, many of whom concentrated on the council’s lack of 
legal foundation and its lack of regulatory powers.
Against this background, the purpose of this thesis was twofold. First, through 
the examination of the AC through the lens of regime theory, it sought to shed light 
on the experience of the council and deepen, in particular, our understanding with 
respect to the AC’s effectiveness, performance, institutional change and dynamics, 
and the role of chairmanship in the AC’s evolution. Second, the study posed 
a question whether the case study of the Arctic Council can, in reverse, contribute 
insights that may be of relevance to our comprehension of regimes and international 
institutions more broadly.
What the study revealed was a series of features exhibited by the AC that 
distinguish it from the previously examined universe of cases of international 
regimes established through the means of international treaties and legally-binding 
instruments. Even if the original formulation of a concept of regimes has never 
specified or constrained the basis of collaboration among states to solely formal, 
legally-binding mechanisms such as treaties or conventions, this is, nonetheless, 
how the concept has been mostly applied in practice and in the empirical studies of 
international regimes. Thus, to distinguish from this formal subset of international 
regimes, on the basis of the case study of the AC I put forward a concept of 
informal international regimes to designate a subset of international regimes that 
are concluded by states through the means of non-legally binding instruments. The 
choice of the name of this category was deliberate in that, in naming these regimes 
‘informal’, rather than ‘soft-law’, my intention was to steer away from the line of 
reasoning which considers legally-binding norms by default superior to non-legally 
binding ones, which focuses primarily on questions of compliance and enforcement 
of international norms, views regimes chiefly in terms of their regulatory functions, 
and is mostly preoccupied with enhancing soft-law mechanisms via legally binding 
means. In moving away from the term soft law, I emphasize the need to consider 
informal international regimes in their own right, rather than, as they are frequently 
viewed, an “underdeveloped” form of collaboration that might evolve into hard law 
and legally-binding commitments in the future. 
On the basis of the observations drawn from the examination of the AC, 
I proposed a series of research questions and hypotheses about informal international 
regimes to be examined and addressed more systematically through future studies of 
the broader class of international regimes.
Among other things, informal international regimes allow for enhanced 
participation on the part of non-state actors and, compared to more formal 
international arrangements, they can be adjusted relatively easily, reflecting a number 
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of features that may make informal regimes increasingly important in meeting needs 
for governance under conditions of rapid, non-linear and compound changes arising 
today and in the foreseeable future. In consideration of these issues, it is important 
to remember that high levels of uncertainty – such as those that characterize present 
times – tend to alter normal utilitarian calculations (Young, 2013) and may also 
increase the receptivity of those engaged in decision-making to considerations of 
mechanisms other than prevailing regulatory, legally-binding arrangements. While 
these are undoubtedly of much importance, the change observed and experienced 
in the Arctic and worldwide demands that we think in new ways about governance 
that will allow for multiple paths and inclusion of a broad range of actors. Viewed 
from this perspective, the Arctic and the Arctic Council can significantly inform 
our thinking about governance in an era of change, where informal international 
regimes present one promising path to pursue. 
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